

# THEOLOGY

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## EDITORIAL

### A GREAT CONGRESS

THE Anglo-Catholic Congress of 1933 was a very memorable gathering, and may prove to be in more ways than one a turning-point in the history of the Church of England. It opened with a certain disadvantage, in that it was the fourth of its kind; and some doubts could not fail to be entertained as to whether the enthusiasm of the movement would stay the course. These misgivings were largely dispelled when the Congress programme was published; for it was plain that the aims of the Congress were conceived on broad and imaginative lines, and that the choice of subjects and speakers was well adapted to express them. Imagination, indeed, seems to me to have been the dominant note of the arrangements: the Pageant of Youth, the great services at Oxford and at the White City, the pilgrimage to Winchester and Hursley—all those were examples of it. And it was justified by the response, expressed in a membership of 70,000 and in the comments of a Press which was obviously more and more impressed by what was said and done. The Congress became a kind of corporate prophecy, bearing witness to the inexhaustible riches of the Catholic Faith, and holding out to the Church and to the world the vision of the way to unity and peace.

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Much, naturally, was due to the fact that the Congress synchronized with the Centenary of the Oxford Movement, a fact which enabled it to make a wider appeal than would otherwise have been possible, and to enlist through the episcopate the sympathy of the Church as a whole. Both the Congress and the Centenary celebrations gained by the association—the Congress, because it was led to emphasize its legitimacy rather than its particularity as an interpreter of Anglicanism; the Centenary, because it acquired a crispness of appeal and a



momentum of energy which the machinery of diocesan committees does not always succeed in producing. The result was to show Anglo-Catholicism at its best—the strength of its theology, the wide range of its interests and outlook, its power of combining imagination with loyalty in its use of the Prayer Book.

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The theological aspect of the movement found expression chiefly in teaching concerning the Church. As the Archbishop of Canterbury said in his sermon on July 9—a sermon which frequently called to mind the writings of Dean Church—such teaching is greatly needed.

“There is still need to remember (he said) that the Church of England derives its spiritual position and claim, not from its being ‘by law established,’ but from its being the historic Catholic Church in this land. It is this which distinguishes it from other Christian communities—this which gives security to its sons and daughters, confidence in its mission, meaning and purpose to its corporate life. It is not merely a religious society to which we belong by custom or tradition or preference. It is the body in which we profess our belief when we say, ‘I believe in one Catholic and Apostolic Church.’”

These words are uncompromising and clear, both in the certitude they offer and in the loyalty they demand. At the same time they claim for the Church of England no exclusive title. The speeches both of Lord Irwin and of the Bishop of Bradford showed, indeed, how the desire for Reunion flows naturally from these convictions. But, as the latter especially reminded us, we must beware of any “fog of amiable optimism.” Nonconformity, despite the insistence of many of its ablest divines on “the priesthood of all believers,” still shrinks from the conception of “a sacerdotal Church”; though the glad and intelligent part which laymen by the thousand played in the Eucharistic worship of the recent Congress may do something to remove their prejudices. In regard to Rome, the Bishop of Bradford struck a new and important note, when he warned us that schism was not the only difficulty:

“It was well for English Churchmen to recognize the fact that not everything that is Roman is Catholic. The consequence of looking either to Paris or Rome for their doctrine was that sometimes, at least, they had been indulgent to heresy out of repugnance to schism. They must revive in their generation the conviction of which the early Tractarians were so full, that they had a complete right to their own tradition of Catholic practice and development, that they held the Catholic Faith as purely as Rome, while, with regard to practice, they were usually as good as Rome was, and often better” (*Church Times* Report, July 21, 1923).



"Indulgent to heresy out of repugnance to schism" is a phrase which diagnoses a state of mind only too well known. And it warns us that such issues as Papal Infallibility, the claim to temporal power and its exercise in history, the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and of Transubstantiation, constitute formidable obstacles to the restoration of unity.

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The reaction of Catholic principles upon a number of social and international problems was the theme of several able addresses. The Bishop of Bradford's plea for a determined effort to improve religious instruction in secondary schools, Mr. Lockhart's appeal (backed by a message from H.R.H. the Prince of Wales) for war upon the slums in the interests of family life, and Professor Kirk's grave words upon the danger to Christian ideals of sexual morality, were utterances which showed how closely the Congress was at grips with the needs of the day. The last-named also presaged a change in the relations of Church and State which the Bishop of Durham did not hesitate to call for under the name of Disestablishment. We rarely find ourselves in disagreement with the Bishop of Durham, whose voice and pen have few rivals in the Church of England today. But we cannot follow him here. Constitutional changes in the laws governing the relations of Church and State there probably should be and will be: but why a partnership which has worked so beneficently for so many centuries should be dissolved because on one recent occasion the temporality invaded the sphere of the spirituality we cannot see. Had the State shown any disposition to exploit its action on that occasion, and to claim to exercise the kind of powers which it exercised almost as a matter of course a century ago, the dissolution of the partnership might well have become necessary. But exactly the reverse has been the case. The truth is that on that occasion both partners made mistakes. The right course is surely for each to give the other time to reconsider the position, and only if such reconsideration proves fruitless dissolve the partnership.

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In a still wider sphere an important contribution to the better understanding of the world we live in was made by the Rev. C. S. Gillett, Principal of Chichester Theological College, who saw in the political development of post-war Europe an ever-growing menace to freedom. Russia, Italy, Poland, Germany have blazed a trail which may yet be followed by other states of equal importance; and in each case the move-



ment is towards an unqualified State absolutism. It may be questioned whether, with the exception of the sixteenth century, there has been anything comparable to this development of absolutism in what is nominally still Christendom since the days of Justinian, if not of Diocletian; and we can be reasonably certain that Russia will not be the only country where the Christian Church as such will be persecuted. The chief responsibility for meeting the attack on Christian liberty seems likely to fall, at least for the time being, on the authorities of the Roman Church; and they need the assurance of our prayers in a battle which in principle is as much ours as theirs, and which, for all we know, may before long have reached the thresholds of our own doors.

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In two leading articles on the Centenary celebrations, published on July 21 and 28 respectively, the *Church Times* sums up their lessons. In the first, entitled "And Now?" our contemporary calls upon the bishops to lead the movement whose faith and devotion have been focussed in the Congress. In the second, entitled "The Bishops and the Rite," it calls upon the Anglo-Catholic clergy to realize that the Prayer Book is "the Missal of their Mother Church," and to observe its directions; and it quotes the Dean of Rochester's statement that "the ordinary Englishman will never understand an English Catholicism which does not come to him through, and in company with, the Prayer Book." The two appeals are not quite *pari passu*: the second, at least, admits of a far simpler response than the first, and one that must precede such response as the episcopate can give. None the less we believe that the episcopate can do much. Much, let us say at once, has been done since Bishop Burge in 1920 called the leaders of that first Congress into consultation; and the support given to the present Centenary by the Archbishops and Bishops (amongst whom we naturally think with special affection of the Bishop of London) has gone far beyond what then seemed probable.

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The real difficulty arises when we try to define the form which this episcopal leadership should take. It cannot be such as involves new organization, for bishops have a very complex organization to administer in their own dioceses, and their time-table is full. Equally, it must not be partial; for the Church contains men of many standpoints and traditions, and the support given by Evangelicals to the Centenary just ended accounted not a little for its spiritual power and effectiveness.



But there is something, we think, which the bishops and only the bishops can do; one sphere in which they and they only can give a lead. It is the sphere of the fundamental assumptions of Anglicanism, of which they are the guardians and interpreters. The claim of the Catholic movement has been that its apparent innovations were either implicit in Anglican formularies, or at the least concordant with them. It was so with the revival of the Religious Life, with the development of Eucharistic worship, with the introduction of Confession, with the improvement of ceremonial. And all these principles, though at first opposed, and later tolerated, have now become taken for granted as legitimate elements in the life of the English Church. It is at that last stage that the leadership of the episcopate becomes decisive: for it is their authority which admits a principle to the sphere of things taken for granted, and only then are they able to regulate and guide the practice based upon it. Inevitably the bishops are accused in doing so of a final betrayal of Protestantism; but the accomplishment of this stage has been in fact in each case a victory not for any party, but for the Church and for common sense. That is why we think that the 1933 Congress may prove to be a turning-point in the history of the Church of England. The co-operation between the organizers of the Congress (to whose imagination, tact, and efficiency the greatest credit is due) and the Church as a whole represented by the Episcopate shows what can be done when Anglo-Catholicism is taken for granted. An immense volume of zeal and devotion are brought into the work and worship of the Church; while on the other hand the movement is cleansed of those asperities and eccentricities which have often dogged its footsteps. And it becomes clear that the fullest Catholic life and witness are wholly compatible with a just consideration for others who, while sharing the same faith and the same sacraments, lay the emphasis in their religion on other points and see things in a different perspective.

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## JOHN KEBLE AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT\*

"For their sakes I sanctify myself" (John xvii. 19)

OF all the meetings and services held in the last few days in connection with the Oxford Movement none has been more appropriate or moving than that in which we are now taking part. We meet in the parish in which John Keble lived and worked for thirty years: we are worshipping in the church built largely from the proceeds of the sale of the *Christian Year*, and in which he so faithfully ministered the Word and the Sacraments: in a few minutes we shall stand by his grave while we sing one of the best known of his hymns. So it will be natural tonight if I speak to you about John Keble and the example he has left us, for in his life and in his theological teaching we shall find the qualities which have characterized the Movement in its finest and noblest aspects.

First we find in him holiness of life. It is much to be regretted that in our Prayer Book Calendar there are no names of post-Reformation saints. This omission sometimes gives rise to misunderstanding, and the taunt has been directed against our Church that it has no saints of its own since it was separated from Western Christendom. We know how untrue this statement is. Our Church can point to a noble army of men and women who have been "chosen vessels of God's grace and lights of the world in their several generations." Among these would be John Keble. I saw a few days ago the copy of a letter (I doubt if it has ever been published) from the Archbishop of Canterbury of that time on the death of Keble. He writes, "Our Church has indeed lost one of its purest and brightest lights—one of its very holiest and most saintly ministers," and he ends the letter by saying, "If ever man died in the odour of sanctity, I do believe our dear friend did." He had the combination of qualities which are the marks of the true saint. Some of his portraits give the impression mainly of gentleness and meekness. He had indeed humility, but with it there went unflinching courage in the assertion of what he believed to be true. There was great love and sympathy for others: but he could also be very severe. There was no element of self-seeking or personal ambition; he was content to serve year after year in his little country parish. To him religion was the all-absorbing interest and concern of life. God in His Majesty

\* A Sermon preached by the Bishop of Winchester in Hursley Church, in connection with the Centenary of the Oxford Movement, on July 17, 1933.



and Holiness was ever in his mind. Before Him he bowed in awe and fear. He impressed those who knew him with the intense reverence with which he approached and spoke of sacred things. In him there was to be found none of that flippancy and familiarity which some affect when they are speaking of God, His Bible, and His Sacraments. About him there was something of the numinous, which gave those who met him the impression of the gravity and seriousness of one who ever moved in the holy places.

There was nothing the Church of England needed more than the pursuit and witness of holiness. It had its devout and self-sacrificing members: we must not forget the self-discipline and devotion of the Clapham Sect. But the tone of the Church as a whole was secular. It could not be truly described as a school for saints. Worldliness and self-complacency had entered into it. Its vision of God was very weak. The first aim of the Movement was a protest against the low ideals of the time and a call to holiness of life. In an often quoted passage Dean Church in his *History of the Oxford Movement* writes: "The movement had its spring in the consciences and characters of its leaders. To these men religion really meant the most awful and most seriously personal thing on earth. It had not only a theological basis: it had still more deeply a moral one." Through penitence and communion, through retreats and quiet days, through rules for the devout life, the Oxford Movement has sought to win men to a greater holiness of life. It has freely drawn on methods which have proved helpful in the experience of the Church in past ages in the building up of the spiritual life. But its greatest incentive to holiness has been found in the lives of its leaders who have dwelt in the Presence of God, for among them were those who were like men who, with "open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

Secondly, Keble was a most true and faithful parish priest. A true parish priest has three fields in which he must exercise his ministry: *in his church*, where he preaches the Word, ministers the Sacraments, and leads his people in reverent and devout worship; *amongst the faithful*, whom by spiritual advice and counsel he must build up ever more and more into the likeness of Christ; and *amongst those of his parishioners, who rarely if ever attend the services of the church*. In each of these fields we can see how truly Keble fulfilled his ministry. He had daily service in this church according to the direction of the Prayer Book. During a time of exceptional controversy he said the Litany on Wednesdays and Fridays at 5.30 a.m.



"to give those who fear God and believe His Sacraments and love His Church a chance of calling upon Him in the early morning, while they are on their way to their day's work." His sermons without any eloquence were simple and direct. The reverence with which he read prayers and lessons was long remembered. Most zealously, too, he sought to build up the souls of the faithful. His activities as a spiritual adviser were not of course confined to those who lived within his parish: his letters show how carefully and wisely he sought to help those who turned to him for assistance in their spiritual difficulties. But the people of his parish were his main concern. One hour every morning was spent in teaching in the school. The preparation for Confirmation was most thorough. We are told that "if any boy or girl lived too far off to come to the classes, he would walk out himself at night with a lantern and teach them in their cottages after their work was over." Nor did he confine himself only to those who regularly came to church. He was the pastor of the whole parish, moving amongst the most careless and indifferent, zealous by rebuke or persuasion to bring them nearer to God.

The early Tractarians by word and life raised the whole conception of what was expected of the clergy. When the Movement failed at Oxford, it found new life in the poorest parishes of the great cities where the clergy who had been influenced by it with devotion and self-sacrifice carried the light of the Gospel to the darkest and most difficult of the slums. They showed that Ordination was not merely admission to a profession, but consecration to life-long service in the ministry of Christ: that it involved not merely ministration to a congregation, but seeking the souls for whom Christ died. I am sure that we need today to emphasize strongly the pastoral and evangelistic work of the pioneers of the Oxford Movement. There is a very real danger lest punctilious care over the performance of the services of the Church and intensive ministration to a small flock of faithful may be treated as substitutes for the more difficult duty of converting those who know not Christ. Sometimes the policy of waiting within the Church for those who desire help instead of going forth to find them is deliberately encouraged and defended. I am sure that through the decline of pastoral visitation the Church is losing its hold in parish after parish: no beauty of ceremonial, no eloquence in preaching, soundness in doctrine, or care for the congregation can compensate for its lack. Older members of the Catholic Movement often tell me, and my own experience confirms their opinion, that it is in this respect they feel the younger clergy are departing most



gravely from the example set by those who carried the Movement from the Universities to the Parishes.

The third characteristic to which I want to draw attention is Keble's loyalty to the Church of England. He believed in it as a true and living branch of the Catholic Church with the Scriptures, Creeds, Sacraments and Orders of the Universal Church: with a history which carried it to the days of the Apostles: with an independent spiritual life which would survive any changes in its relationship to the State. It was true that the Church lacked discipline and vision, but with quiet hope and faith he looked forward to the day when revival of Church life would supply all that was lacking in it. While ready to appreciate all that was true and beautiful in the Roman Church, there was never at any time any likelihood of his joining it. In a letter to Newman he argues against secession on the ground "that for what is wrong without our fault in the place where God's providence has set us we are not answerable, but we *are* for what may be wrong in the position we choose for ourselves." When Newman and others joined the Roman Church, Keble stood quietly firm. His conviction of God's good purpose for the Church of England had been confirmed by the spiritual graces he had seen in some of her children, while as a theologian he had learnt that Rome erred in matters of truth, charity, and proportion. Later when the danger of another batch of secessions to Rome was great he urged patience: haste seemed to be a fatal error, and repeatedly he called for the exercise of forbearance. Very strongly he urged men to remain members of the Church of England: "The whole air of England seemed to ring with the voices from the dead and from the living, especially from the holy dead, all to this effect—'Stay here, think not of departing, but do your work.' " Like St. Paul he did not merely see the Church of his day as it actually was with its weakness and imperfections, but as God meant it to be, the Body of Christ, united, holy, perfect, the household of grace and love. It was for the realization of this that he remained in the Church of England as a true and loyal member, confident of the Catholicity of her mission and of her destiny.

It is this loyalty in our Church and confidence in its future that is most sorely needed at the present time. No society can go forward with strength and hope if its members have little belief in it and are always criticizing its leaders and its rules. Our Church will never be able to accomplish its mission to the nation if it is weakened by incessant criticism from within, or if its clergy and laity are incessantly apologizing for it. As in our nation there is always a small body of discontented persons who



speaking as if every other nation was better than their own, so in our Church there can be found those who speak of their Mother in patronizing or deprecating tones. Such can never do good work in a Church of whose claims and position they are so doubtful; rather they are to it a source of weakness and disaffection. The Church has a right to claim loyalty from both its clergy and its laity. Though they may criticize certain aspects of it, though they may see its weakness and its failures in various directions, yet they must also love and serve it as the true historic Catholic Church of this land commissioned by our Lord for His work. That was the position of Keble, Pusey, and the leaders of the Movement who remained true to their Church. We who are their successors claim that we belong to a Church which is Catholic in origin, life, and purpose, and which can justify its claims by an appeal to the Scriptures, to history, and to sound learning. Only if we have greater confidence in our Church, greater loyalty to its position, greater respect for its authority, can we hope to accomplish the work God has given us, to extend and to build the Kingdom of Christ in our land.

For our Church today, and not only for one party in it, we require more of the holiness, the pastoral zeal, and the loyalty which are found so strikingly in John Keble. Lift up your hearts, then, this evening in prayer that God may grant ever more abundantly to our Church these qualities of holiness, zeal, and loyalty: that inspired by the example of John Keble, Edward Bouverie Pusey, Richard Church, Edward King, and countless others we may follow them in building up the walls of Jerusalem in this land. Lift up your hearts in thanksgiving for the steadfastness, wisdom, strength, and vision of those who stood true to the Church when others despaired of its future: above all, let us thank God for the holy life of John Keble, who, amidst stormy and anxious days in humility, courage, and love, bore his witness to the faith and endured as ever seeing Him who is invisible.

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### NEWMAN AND THE VISION KEBLE SAW

It seems almost startling to find that Newman is a defaulter from the Vision. Some mental conventions are the reasons for our surprise. They have prevented us from doing what the Centenary must do—put the traditional views aside and see men and things as they are. Two have been imposed on us by foreign influence; one we have imposed on ourselves. This is the first convention. In the biography of an extraordinary experimenter with metrical forms, Dr. Liddon is described as



"a great champion of Christian dogma" who brings into "relief the infinite gulf between supernatural faith and natural reason." Thus Hopkins, the poet, who went into the Church of Italy to join Newman, had supernatural faith: Liddon, the theologian, who remained in the Church of England, exercised reason like any of the Stoics. Justin Martyr appears to have said a little more for the Greek philosophers who were before Jesus. The second convention can be illustrated from the same book. Dr. Pusey is said to have set up his *Via Media* in bewilderment and exasperation at the exodus of men from the Church of England to the Church of Italy. His *Eirenicon* was in the nature of a call of despair. And his plan would seem to have been the sinking of a pleasant and turfed walk behind the ancient walls of Oxford to ward off the irresistible spell of Newman. The first of these has implicit acquiescence yielded to it; and the second explicit acceptance shown it. This book in which are these conventions was published as recently as 1930. And there is scarcely a book of worthy Anglican sort, issued from Newman's time down to that year, which does not hasten to grant the claim about faith—though the adjective is variable. Whilst the "Middle Way" has still a place in the Anglican vocabulary. There are some, indeed, who would claim that its establishment was a part of the Vision.

The third mental convention is that Newman is a pilgrim of the Vision. Either he saw but a gleam in the Church of England and followed on to find the complete Vision in the Church of Italy, or he left one type to go on to another type of Vision. Both opinions are held. Newman, indeed, is looked upon as a typical spiritual pilgrim of the nineteenth century, whilst the poem he wrote when on the Straits of Bonifacio serves but to deepen the impression of Newman as the seeker for the Vision. No student of the man and his works could deny to him the right to be called a seeker. The problem of the designation arises with the term Vision. What is its content? The answer to that question will extrude the three conventions from our minds.

It is to be put thus: Liddon stayed because of the Vision of the Lord of the "Body of Christ" dominating, in every faculty, the Church of England as a portion of Himself and itself; Newman went because of the idea of the domination of Christendom by a single historic ecclesiastical body. There was, then, the Vision unto which a man ought to be true and from which a man could default. Its essence has no part in the supremacy of a territorial Church. It is concerned with the paramountcy of the "Head" and the "Body of Christ." The Church of England is serving as that portion in which this



ultimate Vision is to be realized, and whose duty is to lead other Churches to its acceptance. What she is now doing proves that this is a right reading of the situation. The Church of England has been called to leadership in the great matter of the unity of Christendom. This is the Vision working itself out in her. She makes errors in approach and statement. She is now too tentative in plan; and again too positive in secondary emphasis. More than often her mind is ruled by internal and external expediencies. She is not yet wholly subject to the Vision. When she is more perfectly surrendered to and enlivened by the Lord of the Church, then her leadership will be without error; and the external conquests of the Vision will proceed without hindrance in design or plea.

Newman's writings disclose that at no moment in his career, either in the Church of England or in the Church of Italy, was he conscious of the glory which had caused Keble to prophesy. We hear his sermons with Arnold's or Shairp's ears; and read his *Apologia* as the record of the way of a fascinating pilgrim. There is no reason why we should listen to Carlyle or Kingsley on him. There is every reason, on the other hand, why his fascination should be lifted off us and we study the disclosures of what he had written with clear eyes.

In 1839 Newman wrote an article entitled *Prospects of the English Church*. When he had been a member of the Church of Italy for a number of years, he characterized it as his last utterance as an Anglican to Anglicans. It is therefore a capital document for the interpretation of Newman. He considered it to be such for the interpretation of the Church of England. "They will not keep standing," he writes, "in that very attitude which you please to call sound Church-of-Englandism or orthodox Protestantism. It tires them, it is so very hard; and for the life of them they cannot continue in it long together, where there is neither article nor canon to lean against; they cannot go on for ever standing on one leg, or sitting without a chair, or walking with their legs tied, or grazing, like Tityrus's stags, on the air. . . . The most intense horror of Papacy cannot undo or legitimize fallacies."

The physiological versatility ascribed to our Church should not direct us from Newman's view of our lack of religious versatility. Anglicanism means Protestantism. Anglican theology, which elsewhere means for him the theology of Bishop Bull, is claimed to be natively oppugnant to the Italian Church and churchmanship. The English Church disclaims an essential function, if Canterbury be not in opposition to Rome. The major interest of this opinion is not in what Newman says about us, but what this view reveals concerning himself. This opinion



exhibits the rule over Newman's mind of a series of related antitheses. The first of which is Anglicanism and Italianism. This antithesis he considers to be inherent in both systems of ideas.

Another portion of this important article states: "Anglo-Catholicism is a road leading off the beaten highway of Papacy; it branches off at last, though for some time it seems one with it. Accordingly they look on the English Church as a fraudulent come-off, a sort of *cul de sac* and by-path which brings persons indeed to what looks like a holy place and a temple, but which is only so from an external resemblance of venerableness; like those modern specimens of architecture on which the plasterer's skill has been made to imitate the effects of time." The second antithesis which fits over the first is Anglican Protestantism and Italian Catholicism. Newman's notion of inherency passes on to these successive antitheses.

Now Newman was both the technician and destroyer of the theory of the *Via Media*. His account of its genesis is as well its obituary. "The innate persuasiveness, as he understood it, of the *Via Media* was in truth the writer's chief stay in controversy. He did not set much by patristical literature or by history. He frankly allows that his theory has never been realized. . . . He felt the Anglican hypothesis could shoot up and thrive in gaps between the trees which are the pride of the Eden of primitive truth, neither choking nor choked by their foliage. And he hoped to be able to retain Origen and Cyprian, though he held by Laud." This theory or hypothesis on paper—a scheme which was Newman's own—is in reality a mediant thesis to his series of antitheses. It is their child. A piece of argumentation forced into being by the pressure of a series of mental opposites contrived by himself. There was no appeal to evidence. Even Laud is made accessory to his "Anglican hypothesis," and is not handled as a witness with a mind and voice of his own standing and time. Newman's *Apologia* supplies his further pairs of antitheses which are to be fitted over the others. The four pairs are as follows: (1) Anglicanism and Italianism; (2) Anglican Protestantism and Italian Catholicism; (3) Sixteenth century ideas and Primitive Truth; (4) Rationalism and Italy. These were all present to his mind when he was writing his 1839 article, which, as we have seen, was a self-pronounced verdict of erasure against his own theory. "I was in truth winding up my accounts with it," is his more commercial figure of speech in a later reflection on what he had written.

The problem we are pursuing is one in mental technique, and not one of ecclesiastical controversy. That series of antitheses which fits so closely over one another, with its out-thrust medial



piece of logic, is a diagram of Newman's mind at work. He could not technically attach himself to or raise his mind towards the Vision. He had joined an ecclesiastical party, as he considered it; and he ever asked the reasons why he had done so. His *Apologia* notably demonstrates that. Kingsley's insult was the occasion of his having written that book: Newman's desire to give a complete diagrammatic view of his mind was the reason for its appearance. Let there be granted his peculiar loneliness, his high and proper sense of moral worth, and the empire of the antitheses over him—then Newman would have to create his "Anglican hypothesis," yield to its quadruple tyranny, and give out his defence of what he had done. Another imperious reason why he should follow this way is in the fact that he was almost a poet. Some of these features in him will come up for examination. At this moment we are concerned with the view that Newman could and would not raise his head to the Vision.

There are moments when it looked as if he might see beyond his theory. One such moment is to be found in his interest in the Episcopal Church of America. Once he almost granted that Canterbury could have New York as her daughter. That from the Anglican Church could spring the American Church. His essay upon the subject has in it some light and movement. Later he had to compose its supplement. This has neither of those qualities. The antitheses had forced the problem on him whether "the Anglican Church is able to propagate its kind, and that fecundity is a sign of life, and life a sign of divine origin." His mediant thesis answers the problem: "If indeed it is the life of religion to be the first point in the Queen's crown, and the highest step to her throne, then doubtless the National Church is replete with life; but the question has still to be answered, Life of what kind? Heresy has its life, wordliness has its life; is the Establishment's life merely material life, or is it something more? Is it Catholic life as well? Is it supernatural life?"

His thesis has acquired a broad Italian accent. It is the same as it always was, except for that quality. Newman never saw that the Church of England, in her relations with the Church of America, was occupied with the latter's membership in and of the "Body of Christ." She had no concern for an American copy of herself. America is building even the national cathedral in her own way. What English stone is in its fabric comes from the Anglo-Saxon Church of St. Martin. Therein is an historical parable touched with the Vision. The history of that virile Church shows that, though Canterbury and New York have filial relations, yet these are realized fundamentally in their co-membership of the "Body of Christ." Newman could not gain



a glimpse of that achievement from his "Anglican hypothesis." His antitheses held his eyes to the Italian scene.

Viewing him as a religious writer, one of the surprises Newman gives us is the small interest in his books concerning the "Body of Christ." Its beauty could not be crushed into his thesis or antitheses. His statements about them are very many, but that conception does not visit them. A Polish authority on Newman has recently published a "Synthesis" of his thought. Passages from his works are arranged under appropriate headings. Under the subject of the "Living Church" there is but one passage taken from his Anglican period. The gatherer could scarcely cull another.

The perfect comment on Newman's ways with these great matters is in one of his most significant passages. Its place of occurrence is as interesting as its statements for the student of Newman's ways of thought. It comes in the Preface to the third edition of his *Via Media*. The book is Newman's "Anglican Hypothesis" in long exposition. The Preface indicates the short shrift given to it when Newman obeyed the rulers of his mind. He writes: "When our Lord went up on high, He left His representative behind Him. This was Holy Church, His mystical Body and Bride and Divine Institution, and the shrine and organ of the Paraclete, who operates through her till the end comes. She, to use an Anglican poet's words, is 'His very self below,' as far as men on earth are equal to the heritage and fulfilment of high offices, which primarily and supremely are His. . . . I must not in this argument be supposed to forget that the Pope, as the Vicar of Christ, inherits these offices and acts for the Church in them. This is another matter; I am speaking here of the Body of Christ, and the sovereign Pontiff would not be the visible head of that Body did he not first belong to it. He is not himself the Body of Christ, but the chief part of the Body."

The position represented by this passage is not met by saying it indicates merely Newman's view when he had gone to the Church of Italy; and that the bulk of the book goes to show how he put the subject of the "Body of Christ" whilst he was in the Church of England. This passage is the product of his mental reactions to his own thesis and antitheses. His book has nothing to do with the great subject; it elaborates his own body of thought. The discovery of the plan of Newman's mind, and of the fact that his eyes were shaded to its levels—whether he was in the Church of England or in the Church of Italy—gives shape to another question which is fundamental to any knowledge of its ways. What set Newman unto subjection to the antitheses and the creation of the thesis?

The simplest answer to that question is: "Newman himself."



He had to come under their rule. This is a possible conclusion from his career. It becomes a most probable one from the study of some valuable pieces of autobiography.

The first note in this answer is in a letter Newman sent to his mother, which discusses the question whether he was a lonely child and youth. "Take me," he writes, "when I was most foolish at home, and excited much with childishness; stop me short and ask me then what I think of myself, whether my opinions are less gloomy; no, I think I should sincerely return the same answer that 'I shuddered at myself.'"

The second note tells us that he moved then in a world which responded to the person he was and the person he shuddered from: "I thought life might be a dream, or I an angel, or all this world a deception, my fellow-angels, by a playful device, revealing themselves to me, and deceiving me with the semblance of a material world." Or in another place he says of himself as a child: "He listens, indeed, with wonder and interest to fables and tales; he has a dim shadowy sense of what he hears about persons and matters of this world." These two touches of personal history come from two of his writings which are accounts of his religious Odyssey.

The third note is in his own description of the general tendency of his mind—a subject he took up on more than one occasion. Newman says he had a "strong intellectual tendency to general scepticism." These notes are enough to establish the first psychological hints of what has been called the diagram of Newman's mind.

His inner life was primarily engaged with the conflicts of self and anti-self, the man he was and the man who shrank away. The shadowy nature of the world in which he moved was the creation of an imaginative unworldliness, and not of a religious other-worldliness. This half-reality and half-unreality companioned the self he was and the reacting anti-self. His questions came from the to-and-fro contacts of these.

To such conditions of his inner life was added a little later something of the religious philosophy of John Calvin. This caused Newman not to be lonely so much as to pick out himself as he was from among other men, and in turn to etch more firmly the picture of God as the Supreme Other in the universe as he realized it. The Genevan's determinism lent direction to the Englishman's scepticism. Newman could begin to philosophize in his own way with himself and the world. Calvin engrained the doings of Newman's inner life. The activities of self and anti-self took on intellectuality. They were not indoctrinated. They grew up, as it were, from the child into the adult stage. From the gentler manners which could feel and scarcely ask questions



to the sharper activities which would only frame questions. Newman's idea of the world did not alter. His epitaph shows that. It merely went on from imaginative to religious values as he became older. He went as one who walked not on the earth. The feature in this analysis to be noticed now is that the native and poetic drama of self and anti-self has taken on an intellectual cast. It is with that sort of mind Newman came to the Church of England.

He brought it to the Oxford Movement. It was not made by the Movement. His commerce with the leaders in Oriel College seemed but to turn his Calvinism back into Newmanism. Both self and anti-self were awakened to acquire fresh means of speech. What he heard daily became their vocabularies. The antitheses, which have been found to be the rulers of his mind, are the vocabularies acquired by the two which were in him from his early days.

All the while there has been a middle-man between these two. Newman has called him his scepticism. He could question the two and agree with neither. Therefore their fire and friction wrought in him a thesis which came between their opposites. The antithetical theories brought to birth a middle theory. The mediator found his sceptic vocabulary. Newman recorded this in the two volumes of his *Via Media*: the dialect of a theory for which there was no *Grammar*. Yet it had to come into being because of the strife of tongues in which self and anti-self were engaged.

It was with this conflict in inner life that Newman took his place in public life. He became the rhetorician of the Oxford Movement, as he called himself. That "complex of chaste beauty" which was Newman—his character; his unwordly appearance; his voice, which was the fitting instrument of the man, and the artist in words—found its vocation in the pulpit of the University Church at Oxford. No wonder he drew men. No one of his contemporaries had personal magic like his. Moreover, the study of his sermons, in the light of this analysis of his intellectual life, shows that in them he projected his attractive and disquiet mind. Not its vocabulary, but its drama. Not its middle hypothesis, but its hope and fear. Not its dialectical conflict with this or that member of the antitheses, but its disappointments in moral endeavour. Not its dogmas, but its doubts. There is a full-length portrait of Newman's mind in his sermons. They were its soliloquies. Though his auditors knew not this, they fascinated them. Hearing them, they thought often that they listened to themselves. Unconscious of the projection of the drama of his mind, they saw re-enacted something of what was going on in their own. When the conflict



seemed not to be theirs, they thought they had heard and seen what was being done in a heaven above the earth. Sometimes the pulpit was as a mount of judgment; at other times it seems as if bright presences came down the rays of light which centred on the preacher; and in most of the time the glimpses and lights of Newman's idea of the world called to his auditors as strains of unearthly music or poetry call. The whole robed the man; and he wore the robes with compelling simplicity and spirituality.

There is material in his sermons which declares to readers with ear and eye that it is not there because of any drama of the soul. It almost looks like borrowed stuff. Sumner and Whately seem to be a little rephrased by Newman. This material covers general considerations on the Church and themes of the creeds. Its statements have not the colour of life which belongs to what has been called the soliloquies in his sermons. They yield an impression as if they were made under control. This would not have been exercised by the two men named, though Newman was given Sumner's writings at a time of crisis in his life. Nor is there any evidence that the influence of Hurrell Froude, for example, could have gone thus far with him. The explanation of the condition and presence of such material comes out when he has crossed the Alps. As he went he left most of the man of the inner drama on this side of the Alps; but that material went with him to the other side. As it stands in his sermons it has no marked English or Italian tendencies. After the journey is made, it is clear that the choice and the statement of this material were always under the control of the Italian antitheses of his mind.

If no one can impugn the moral beauty of the man, and no one can, what was the quality of his default from the Vision? We have watched the last scene in Newman's drama. A clever case could be made out for its coming from the influence of certain of his friends who, in affection and argument, had beleaguered him so that the many had to fall before the one idea. They dwelt much on English as opposed to Italian ideas. Some of them were almost blind to the Vision of the "Body of Christ." This singularly gifted man, with his artistic sensibilities, could have yielded to these local influences. He was as unaware of the Vision as some of his contemporaries. But it was what gave him distinction above them, and set up the dramatic activities of his mind, that caused him to believe there was no Vision in the Church of England. Further, those activities moulded him to the Italian idea, so that he might not catch sight of more than an English idea which was to be abandoned. The territorial institution on Italian soil had finally become the equivalent of the spiritual, and therefore universal, "Body of Christ." He



had and could not raise his eyes to see how the Vision was using and would use the Church of England.

There is now no call to accumulate types of defaulters. It is enough to demonstrate that the Vision was and is in the Church of England. Therefore it can be defaulted from, whether after 1833 or 1933. Our eyes can still be holden from the Vision. Words have as much power over us now as then. The pressure of events, like the growing union among Churches which recognize episcopal government, can keep our eyes to the levels of territorial theories. Most of the major problems in Europe have been put off, during the last century, by re-arranging the European map. It has become a habit with us all. We wonder whether the water of the Thames could be made to flow between the banks of the Tiber; or if Tiber's waters might come very near to Westminster Abbey. The problem of the Church of Jesus Christ does not consist in redrawing the religious map of Europe. This itch for the cartographer's pen ought to be overcome. When it is drawn, it will have to be a map of the world as it is seen by Him. Our task is to vindicate consciously this truth, that the Vision is in the Church of England. Our realization of the fact of the "Body of Christ" and of the life of its Head should so commend the Church's acts and words that none, within or without her membership, might doubt or deny the Vision. How could they? When every hour showed that its most lovely Life was made more actual in her.

V. BURCH.

### WHAT IS A MIRACLE?

"Le miracle m'est très antipathique." These are the words, not of a man of science or of letters, but of a devout and deep-thinking Christian, the Abbé Huvelin, von Hügel's spiritual director. And Bishop Gore declares (*Belief in God*, p. 216) that the *a priori* assumption that miraculous events cannot really have occurred is at the root of the rejection of historical Christianity by a great part of the intellect of modern Europe.

What is it that the intellect rebels against? Is there an explanation and justification of this instinct of antipathy, so common and so strong?

I assume as axiomatic Dr. Gore's own clear and forcible statement that "The very being of God is law and order. Nothing arbitrary or disorderly or disconnected in action can be conceived in connection with Him. The uniformity of nature is the exhibition of His perfect orderliness." From this



it would seem to follow that, if by a "miracle" is meant something "arbitrary or disorderly or disconnected," it is either inconceivable as a matter of fact (which is what the critics of miracles maintain), or else the work of some power antagonistic to God and bent upon introducing disorder into His creation. But "disorderly" is just what popular Theology declares miracles to be—not, of course, in the sense that they are fortuitous or unmeaning, but that they are violations of the order of Nature.

### I.

Up to quite recent times nature was regarded as a closed system, proof against the intrusion of anything from outside. Science said, Absolutely proof: Theology said, Proof except in the case of miracles. From the earliest times Theology argued upon this assumption. The supposed evidential value of miracles rested upon it. As late as 1865 we find such an acute and virile thinker as J. B. Mozley arguing that there must be "visible suspensions of the order of nature," as the guarantee and voucher of a revelation, and as "proof, as distinguished from mere surmise, of a divine design." The demonstration that there is a Divine Controller of the natural order was supposed to be founded upon the fact that He could break into it when He chose, though He only did so upon special occasions. Intelligent apologists of Christianity make less use of this line of argument now. The evidential value of miracles is not so great as was imagined. The appeal of Christianity is to something deeper than the sense of wonder: and if that something deeper fails, men "will not be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

But modern philosophy does not regard nature as a closed system; nor does it think of the world as something which came into existence once for all, whole and complete, at a definite point of time. Such a conception inevitably leads to a mechanical, determinate view of the universe. For even if you admit that the history of the world has been a process of evolution, the course of its evolution, from the old point of view, has to be regarded as following a fixed, inevitable direction, determined from the beginning. At any stage, with complete knowledge of all the antecedents, the next stage could be foretold, inasmuch as it is simply the resultant of causes inherent in the antecedents and nothing else. The universe, if not a mere machine, at all events is sustained and developed upon mechanical principles. This may be paradoxically described as a static view of evolution, and it is rapidly becoming obsolete.

In its place there has emerged what may be called the



*dynamic* view of nature. The world is regarded as the manifestation of the sustained activity of an illimitable energy or force. This energy must have a source—at all events for anyone who cannot be content with a mere abstraction as the ultimate truth about what exists; but into the characteristics of that source, except in so far as they are indicated in nature, the philosophy of nature does not enquire. It must be rational, for nature is a rational system or there would be no science; but the question whether it is personal or impersonal, good or evil, moral, immoral or non-moral, does not directly concern science as such. In any case, the ultimate postulate of science is a fund of energy which, when it finds its expression in nature, is said to emerge into actuality. We thus get the idea of a world which never had a birthday in the old sense, but is the subject of a perpetual generation. In the background there is a realm of possibilities in comparison with which all that we know of the sum total of existence fades into insignificance. In this ideal realm there is nothing that is not rational, but an infinity of forms which, so far as we know, have never taken actual shape. To take a simple instance: it is easy to imagine a whole world of animals or plants or mineral substances such as might have existed, some of which may possibly exist, but which have never come within the range of our experience.

The champion of the closed system theory must maintain either that there is no such realm of ideal possibilities at all, or that, if there is, a great gulf is fixed between it and nature, so that nothing passes from one to the other. The answer in either case is that metaphysics suggest, not merely that what is new does sometimes insinuate itself into the world order, but that the fusion of the new with the old and the consequent production of something which is in itself new, though it is in organic connection with the old, is precisely what continued existence means. It is easy to think of the world as a process of growth, and we can, by abstraction, regard this process as consisting of a continual passing from one instantaneous phase to another. But these phases, which the mind isolates by a kind of instantaneous photography, are not really separate and are not mere repetitions. Each one is different from all that have preceded it. If you turn from the contemplation of the world as a whole, and consider any one particular "event," it is clear that each event is unique. There is something in it which has never been in any other event. It represents a new combination. A straight line or a curve can be regarded, for mathematical purposes, as a succession of an infinite number of points; but these points are not exactly similar: each is unique in its relation to all the other points in the universe. So the course of nature can



be regarded as a succession of an infinite number of phases, but no phase is exactly similar to any other. Many sciences rest upon such an atomistic conception of the subject-matter with which they deal, and it serves them well: the theory of an illimitable repetition of similar elements provides a basis upon which they can build their superstructures. But philosophy aspires to deal, so to speak, with existence in action: it has to use intellectual abstractions, but it has to remember that behind the abstractions lie the stream and flow of reality. This is what is meant by Bergson's well-known distinction between "duration" and mathematical "time." Existence does not consist of a succession of infinitesimally small jumps from one phase to another, but a process in which there is no break. The world in being is a process of becoming. It is motion, not rest, that characterizes what is real. But motion means change, and change means something new; and this means that nature is not a closed system, but only persists in virtue of a perpetual infusion of something from without.

The ceaseless procession of change which characterizes whatever is actually existent is ordinarily imperceptible to our gross human faculties, and so we tend to think of the whole sum of created things as a static entity, within which kaleidoscopic changes occur the nature of which it is the function of science to investigate. But the truth is, not that all things continue as they were from the beginning and will so continue, but that always and everywhere something new is being perpetually engrafted upon the old, and that the most uncompromising devotee of science in the strictest sense ought to be prepared for the unexpected. The mere fact that a given event has never occurred within the range of our experience gives no warrant for the *a priori* assumption that it never can or will occur, of which Bishop Gore speaks.

But this is only one side of the matter. If nature may be regarded as a flux, it is not a mere flux, but a rational system in process of rational evolution. All knowledge rests upon this supposition. The ideal realm of possibilities is rational too, and the product of its fusion with nature must be rational also. Whatever is real is rational; and if by a "miracle" is meant something which is arbitrary, atomic, or contrary to reason, the only thing to be said about it is that it is unreal and a fiction of the imagination. This is what Spinoza really meant when he laid down the axiom that nothing happens in nature which is in contradiction to its universal laws: this is what is at the bottom of the Abbé Huvelin's "antipathy" to the miraculous.

The law of the uniformity of nature serves two purposes. It is the expression of our belief that whatever occurs in nature



must occur in accordance with the laws of reason; there can be no exception to this. But it is also the expression of the empirical fact that within our human experience, so far as it goes, certain sequences or coincidences have been found to be invariable. There is nothing irrational in the supposition that enlarged experience might force us to modify our conception of observed uniformities: in fact, if there is anything in the dynamic view of nature, that is what we should naturally be led to expect. A law which was an adequate formulation of the known facts at one stage in the history of science will presumably need to be supplemented or amended when new facts are brought to light. This is an obvious truth, and it is regularly acted upon in the course of scientific investigation; but the enormous preponderance of cases in which uniformity has been observed over those cases in which there is an exception inevitably exercises a strong pressure upon the mind to regard the uniformity as invariable and the exception as only apparent, and a reluctance to admit that we may have to alter or expand our ideas. This reluctance is not as great as it used to be. The best modern science is very honest, and it appears to be allowable now to speak disrespectfully even of the law of gravity.

It is important to remember that an event which seems anomalous may eventually prove to be in perfect accordance with known laws. Charles Babbage, the mechanic and mathematician, declared that there was no theoretical reason why a machine should not be constructed which, after recording the first 100,000 natural numbers consecutively, would record 100,100 next, and then go on as before. Peabody imagined a church clock which could be made so as to chime anomalously at the end of a hundred years of regular striking. In both these cases the anomaly would seem to be a mere portent to any person who did not possess enough knowledge to realize the complicated possibilities in the operation of the laws of mechanics. But there would be no real anomaly: the appearance would only be due to the defective mathematical ability of the untrained observer. If such a thing is possible at the mechanical level, the probability of similar explanations of apparent anomalies in the far more complicated chemical or biological worlds certainly cannot be ignored. In other words, we must be prepared to make large allowances, not only for the incompleteness of our experience and of our knowledge, but also for our failure to realize all the implications of the knowledge which we already have.

At the same time, there is no doubt that nature does present itself to us as a uniform system, and our strong presumption that the uniformity, as we understand it, will not be broken is



intelligible enough. The assertion that an apparently anomalous event has occurred rests upon evidence, and we are right in submitting the evidence which is adduced to support it to a rigid, and even a suspicious scrutiny, because we feel a natural reluctance to admit its occurrence. This reluctance is abundantly justified when we consider the character of the evidence upon which many so-called "miraculous" events have been supposed, and are still sometimes supposed, to have actually happened. Hume defined a miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature," and stated that "it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false." His statement holds good even if a so-called miracle is not regarded as a violation of the laws of nature. The strength of the testimony must be such that it is felt to be more *improbable* that it should be false than that the event in question should have occurred. But if the statement is used as an argument against the *possibility* of any anomalous event, it clearly involves a *petitio principii*. The argument that an event cannot really have occurred because it is contrary to our experience is based upon the assumption that our experience covers the whole field of what is possible, and this is precisely the point at issue. The argument is valid against the probability of such an event, and Hume's position really is that the improbability is so great that its occurrence is inconceivable. This will appeal with varying force to different types of mind; but it is based entirely upon experience, and no argument so based is conclusive unless you are prepared to maintain both that our experience is exhaustive and that our interpretation of it is infallible. We are not so certain of this now as we used to be.

St. Augustine wrote: "Portentum fit, non contra naturam, sed contra quam est nota natura" (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 8). The thinking world in the present day would seem to be of the same opinion.

## II.

A new set of considerations is introduced as soon as we come to consider the world of nature as subject to the control of a Power who regulates it in the interests not merely of order, but of *moral* order.

Our experience of life and of the world, with its manifold indications of the incontestable presence of evil, predisposes us to regard the two orders as antagonistic to one another. When they appear to clash, it seems as if nothing but the interposition of a Power which is above them both, acting with special reference to the particular occasion, could resolve the con-



tradition. It is as if there were nature on one side and the moral order on the other, and a God who interfered with nature, when necessary, to bring the lower order into effective subjection to the higher; and such supposed interferences are what is commonly called "miraculous." Now it is possible to maintain, and of course it often has been maintained, that there is something essentially and inherently evil and disorderly in nature itself, including human nature—that evil is part and parcel of what it is now the fashion to call "the structure of Reality." But anyone who is not prepared to acquiesce in a Manichean, dualistic interpretation of the universe must admit that deep down in the constitution of things, *below the level at which evil operates*, there must be a level at which the apparent opposition of the natural and moral orders does not exist. In spite of the devastating effects of evil, which from the point of view of a Christian is to be regarded as an alien intruder into creation, it must be true that there is a fundamental harmony which is not less real because, under present conditions, it is often obscured to human eyes. The God of nature, which is His creation, is the same as the God of the moral order, and His control extends equally over both, and operates continuously and unceasingly in both.

We tend to draw a line between the ordinary, insignificant, semi-automatic actions and occasions in our own lives, which seem to have little or no moral or spiritual significance, and the actions and occasions of which the moral significance is clear, though no one, if pressed, would be prepared to maintain that such a distinction is tenable. In the same way we tend to draw a line between the world of nature, which we regard as morally indifferent, and a moral or spiritual world which we think of as superimposed upon the natural and often in acute conflict with it. This is because we are conscious of the presence of evil in the world as it is. There is something wrong with nature, and there is something wrong with ourselves. The scheme of things is very far from exhibiting a complete harmony, and the fact that dislocation exists dominates our thoughts to such an extent that we read contradiction and opposition into everything. We think of nature, for instance, on the one hand, as orderly but outside the moral sphere, and of ourselves, on the other, as included in that sphere but infected with manifold disorders. And many people think of a miracle as a sort of violent and arbitrary readjustment on a special occasion of something which is out of joint, or as an interference with the ordinary course of events to ensure the attainment of an object of moral and spiritual importance.

But it is surely beyond dispute that, if there is a moral



Governor of the world, He must control everything. The most trivial occurrences, which seem morally neutral, are in reality as truly part of the moral order as actions or events in which the moral issue is clear and obvious to us. That control takes effect, not by the process of introducing the moral order into an order which is not moral when required, but by the ceaseless exercise of a perfectly good and beneficent activity which is omnipresent in all places and on all occasions, pervading the whole of creation, interwoven with the whole texture of the natural as well as of the spiritual, and present in what we call trivial or insignificant as truly and as completely as in what seems to us striking and important. And we are entitled to make this assertion even as regards the world as it is, contaminated with evil; for, if evil is an intrusion and not a necessary part of the scheme of the universe, we must believe, not only that it will be ultimately expelled, but that all through the time process it is in some real sense under God's control.

Assuming, then, that there are observed uniformities in nature and also a moral order, both of which are sustained by God's direct control, and neither of which is subject to any interruptions which can be described as "arbitrary or disorderly or disconnected," it is inevitable that under present conditions it should seem to us that the two orders are often in opposition and that we are faced with the problem of reconciling them. One and the same event in the natural order, the result of a series of sequences regulated by natural laws, might appear to issue in what was good in the case of one individual who was affected by it and in what was bad in the case of another. The moral order often seems to require something in nature which is not there, or to be faced with something in nature which frustrates it. Then the only thing for it seems to be a "miracle." But the supposed need arises from our ignorance. It does not need any deep reflection to enable us to realize how totally inadequate our faculties are to comprehend the infinite variety and complexity of the cosmic order even when regarded simply as the system of nature, and as soon as the idea of a moral order is introduced the complexity is infinitely increased. There are occasions, I suppose, within most people's experience when the moral or spiritual order has seemed as it were to seize upon the natural and wrench it into conformity, or a natural event has mediated some spiritual experience which seems to belong to a totally different world. There are many accounts of historical conversions which are often described as "miraculous" either because the natural event which was their occasion is obviously inadequate in itself to account for the result, or because some coincidence of events occurred which was so remarkable that it



seemed explicable only on the supposition of some dramatic interposition. But there is in reality no need to postulate any action of Providence different in kind from its ordinary manifestation. If there is a Providence, it regulates everything and operates unceasingly. What happens on such occasions is that, whereas we ordinarily are only subconscious, at the best, of its continual operation, the fact then flashes into recognition as the result of a heightened realization of the significance of the event or the experience in question.

Consider such an event as what we call the conversion of St. Augustine. The opening of a book at random and the perusal of a couple of verses of the New Testament determined the subsequent course of his life, and profoundly influenced the whole history of Christianity in Western Europe. The opening of that particular book at that particular place at that particular time can be regarded as simply an event in the natural order: the change in Augustine looks like a more or less catastrophic event of a purely spiritual character; and the problem appears to be to account for the coincidence between the event in what may be described as the natural history of the book and the crisis in the spiritual history of St. Augustine, as though two entities which were themselves disparate had been reconciled and combined by some agency external to both of them. But we are wrong in making this hard-and-fast distinction. A little reflection will make it clear that it is only by the abstractive operation of the intellect that we set the book on one side and Augustine on the other, as if they belonged to two different worlds. All through the infinitely complicated sequence of events in the so-called "natural" world which led to the opening of the book the moral and spiritual orders were both unceasingly at work, and behind the spiritual history of Augustine and interwoven with it there lay the natural order to which he belonged no less truly than the book. The same Providence which controlled the one series of events controlled the other.

The fact is that it appears to us that there is something catastrophic or "miraculous" about an event whenever we vividly realize its importance or significance to ourselves or to the course of history, but the controlling Power and its method of operation are the same on all occasions, great or small, whether we are conscious of it or not.

It appears, then, that we are justified in thinking of the whole course of events as subject to the continuous control of a Power whose operation, even if we exclude for the time the question of the disturbing influence of evil, we may, if we please, describe as *supernatural*, inasmuch as the moral or spiritual, considered by itself as distinct from the natural, is higher than



the natural. The order of nature is the intellectual presentation of what occurs; but the moral order, though no less natural, is something more than a matter of the pure intellect. But *supernatural* is an ambiguous term, and we must be clear as to the sense in which we use it. We must not imply that it is the same as *anti-natural*, or introduce at this stage the theological conceptions connected with the contrast between Nature and Grace.

### III.

But we cannot stop here. Supposing that we agree that the natural and the moral orders are not opposed to one another, that the world is at bottom a good world, it is certain that the aspect which it presents to us is not what we should expect on that supposition. Traces of the malignant activity of an evil principle are everywhere apparent. The disorder is obvious in the moral sphere, and language is often used which seems to imply that it has also invaded what we call the order of nature. This language is not exact. It suffices to express for ordinary purposes such facts as the existence of pain in the animal world: but the evil does not lie in the working of natural laws, but in the effects produced upon sentient or conscious beings. An earthquake or a flood or an accident or a disease are not evil in themselves. As the result of experience we form the idea of a sort of spirit of nature from which we cannot escape, and which often appears cruel or even malignant with a kind of devilish ingenuity. But natural laws are not in themselves cruel or malignant. They are simply what they are, without any *arrière pensée*. All evil is spiritual evil, and living things feel pain because there is something in them which does not belong to the mechanical sphere within which natural laws operate. Science, which deals with nature, has nothing to do with pain: it deals sometimes with phenomena which as a matter of fact are inseparable from pain, but pain itself lies outside the sphere of physical cause and effect. The whole creation is said to be groaning and travailling in pain together because it partakes of an existence which can be only described as spiritual.

A philosopher, unless he frankly adopts a sceptical or agnostic attitude at the outset, sets out on the quest of truth inspired with the belief that existence is an ordered whole, and that, if he is honest and humble and patient and industrious, he will be able to attain to some conception of it as a rational unity. When he finds himself confronted with abundant evidence of the existence of disorder in a world where he expects to find nothing but order, he is brought sharp up, and wants to know more about it. The first question he will ask himself is whether his



expectation was unfounded, whether the disorder is not after all inherent in the very nature of the universe. He may answer it in the affirmative: many philosophers have done so. If he does, all he can do is to acquiesce in the inevitable, to smother his instinct for perfect order, and in practice to set himself to make the best of a bad job after his own fashion. But he may find the instinct too strong to be smothered. He certainly can form the idea of a world from which disorder should be absent, even if he finds the actual world riddled with it. If evil is part of the nature of things, why is he conscious of disappointment? Certainly mankind as a whole have never been content with the prospect of an eternal dualism. They have thought of a Golden Age in the remote past, or of a renovated heaven and earth in the remote future. Nothing is further from their ideas than to be satisfied with things as they are.

If our philosopher on the one hand rejects the supposition that evil is necessarily inherent in the world, and on the other refuses to shut his eyes to the obvious fact that it is undoubtedly there, his conclusion must be that it is to be regarded as an alien influence which introduces disorder into an ideally perfect scheme. This at once raises the question of the possibility of an ultimate restitution. Now this is a question of which philosophy has generally fought shy. It has for the most part been left to the theologians; and there is something to be said for this, for it is a practical question, and the world wants a practical answer. This it is the business of theology to supply. But none the less it concerns the philosopher *qua* philosopher just as much as it concerns the man in the street whose interest in the question of evil is confined to the desire to be rid of it.

Now Christianity, in the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement, claims to present a complete solution of this great problem on its practical side. I am not suggesting that it clears away all speculative difficulties as to why evil was ever allowed to exist at all, or how it came into existence, or how, seeing that it has once existed, things could ever be as though it had not: but the response to the practical need is complete. It asserts that as the result of an event which occurred in the time process and in the phenomenal world the power of evil has been already broken and the ultimate restoration assured. We are justified in believing that evil is an intruder into a good creation, that it is in process of being expelled, and that ultimately it will be annihilated. We can only think in terms of time; and, inasmuch as evil has not yet been banished from the universe but still persists, the only idea of the present position which a Christian can form is that a process has been begun which will have an inevitable consummation in eternity, but



which meanwhile presents itself to us as incomplete. The dislocation continues: the disorder persists; but, all the same, things are not as they were. Something has happened which has made a difference.

The first generation of Christians without doubt expected a sudden and catastrophic end of an evil world and the restoration of a perfect order. It was a very natural expectation. There were words of our Lord which seemed to imply it; and why, if it was the will of God to redeem the world, should it be accomplished by a long drawn out process rather than by instantaneous action which would destroy the evil thing without more ado? But they were wrong. No cataclysm abolished pain and moral evil offhand. What happened was that the agelong warfare between good and evil was henceforth to be carried on under new conditions, that the world could rest in the assurance that its aspiration for a perfect order was not vain.

Now if the redemption of the world, including under that term the victory both over sin and over all other kinds of evil, has been accomplished once for all, which is what Christianity claims, and if the restitution which *sub specie eternitatis* has been already effected is now being worked out in the time order—whether destined to be realized by a secular process of gradual amelioration or completed by some cataclysmic event—we must believe that wherever there is evil, there is also a Power at work which has it under control and is strong enough to annihilate it here and now, whenever and wherever the inscrutable wisdom of God sees fit to do so. That power is not exerted on all occasions, or there would be an end of evil at once. The cleansing and revivifying influence makes itself felt as a healing and purifying agent which works like leaven in the mess of evil, not instantaneously transmuting it as a whole, but sending crystals of purification shooting all through it. These crystals we often, perhaps ordinarily, do not observe, because our sight is dim: but sometimes they flash out and catch our eyes. Such events we can describe as “miraculous,” partly on account of their vivid, arresting character, partly because we did not expect them. They arouse our sense of wonder. But the same purifying process is everywhere at work, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it issues in the immediate destruction of some evil activity or the completion of the process is deferred.

This is von Hügel's conception of what is meant by a “miraculous” experience “when discriminated in the higher religions and by maturely spiritual souls”—that is to say, when freed from the erroneous and unworthy associations which tend to cling round it (*Essays and Addresses*, i., p. 57). It involves



three "vivid, interdependent apprehensions." There is the apprehension of something *unique* being experienced or produced in the particular experiencing soul. There is the apprehension that this unique experience comes from the one Divine Spirit to the particular human spirit. And there is the apprehension that this unique action of the Divine Spirit can and does affect, not only the human spirit, but also the body and its psychical and even physical conditions and environment and the visible exterior conditions and history of mankind. "Grave difficulties," he says, "only arise when these three central experiences are interpreted as meaning that the spiritual or psychical or physical affects of miracle constitute direct breaches within (as it were) the phenomenal trend and level of natural reality—breaches which can be strictly demonstrated to be such by natural science itself." That is to say that difficulties only arise when a "miraculous" event is regarded as a violation of the order of nature, capable of being demonstrated by science as such, a view which we have already seen good reason to reject.

The contrast to be borne in mind is not that between the natural and spiritual orders, which we can regard as distinct but which are not essentially contradictory, but that between the ideal order which is in reality natural (in another and broader sense) and an order which is spotted with evil which is unnatural. What Christianity claims is that the real order is in process of being restored. This can only be effected by a supernatural Power: the natural order cannot purify itself where it has been contaminated. The whole process is supernatural, but it is not wholly "miraculous" in von Hügel's sense of the word. What he meant by a miraculous event or experience was an occasion upon which the redemptive action of the supernatural is so clear and so arresting that it appears to us to be a sort of portent; but it is not a portent in the sense that it is arbitrary or irrational. It may be incomprehensible to us because of the limitation of our powers of comprehension, but there is nothing in it which is contrary to reason, and if our powers were great enough we could comprehend it. This could not be said of a miracle in the popular sense of the word.

The expectation of dramatic interpositions on the part of the supernatural in the natural course of events has always been very common, if not universal. It is probably as old as human nature. It pervades all levels of culture. It persists in its old naïve form over a large area of Christendom at the present time. The modern antipathy to the miraculous among thinking people rests upon two assumptions, one of which is intellectual and is due to a misunderstanding of its nature, while the other is instinctive and justifiable.



The rationalistic tendency of modern thought in general and the dominance of the scientific view of the world in particular has given rise to a widespread and deep-seated reluctance to admit as possible anything which cannot here and now be understood. It is assumed that what we do not know cannot be knowledge. This assumption is not so obstinate as it was thirty years ago. Science is readier to admit that it has not covered the whole of the ground, and is willing and even anxious to adventure into the unknown, so long as it is understood that the unknown is a cosmos and not subject to irrational, chaotic interruptions.

The other and justifiable assumption is that the ascription to the Almighty of actions which in the case of a human being would be described as frivolous or fantastic or capricious is irreverent and intolerable. The annals of hagiology are full of records of actions and events of this description.

There is plenty of room in any sane philosophy of religion for "wonders" which we cannot comprehend, but which neither violate our ineradicable belief in the rationality of the universe nor our unshakable conviction of the dignity of the Most High.

L. V. LESTER-GARLAND.

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## A CHRISTIAN ESTIMATE OF THE BHAGAVAD GITA

### I.

THERE are many aspects of the *Gita* which deserve careful study. In this paper I should like to dwell at some length on the doctrine of God as set forth in the *Gita*.

Let us trace rapidly the course of theistic thought in the early religious literature of India. The polytheistic faith of the *Rig Veda* (1200 to 800 B.C.) had tended to develop in the direction of Monotheism. The god Varuna was endowed with moral qualities and stood out for a moment or two as if he would command the worship and allegiance of the religious people of India. But it was only for a moment or two. His interesting personality soon receded into the background.

In two of the *Upanishads*—namely, the *Katha* and the *Svetasvatara*—the theistic view received further development.

In the *Katha Upanishad* (500 B.C.) God is regarded as being in all things. He is the bodiless among bodies. He is the stable among the unstable. He is the constant among the inconstant. He is the inner soul of all beings. There is a great difficulty which confronts the doctrine that God is the inner



controller of everything. For in that case how are we to explain the presence of evil in the world? Either we must consider that God is evil or we must say that there are some evil things in the world which are beyond God's control. The author of the *Katha Upanishad* meets this difficulty by suggesting three illustrations. Fire takes the shape of anything it burns, and yet it is different from it. Air keeps its own real nature, though it takes the form of whatever body it enters.

As the Sun, the eye of the whole world,  
Is not sullied by the external faults of the eyes,  
So the one Inner Soul of all things  
Is not sullied by the evil in the world, being external to it.

Thus God, while He dwells in the world, is considered to be free from its imperfections. The *Katha* teaches further the doctrine of grace.

The Soul is not to be obtained by instruction,  
Nor by intellect, nor by much learning.  
He is to be obtained only by the one whom He chooses;  
To such a one that soul reveals his own person.

The *Svetasvatara Upanishad* (500 to 300 B.C.) contains the fullest expression of the theistic belief to be found in the *Upanishads*. This *Upanishad* illustrates in various ways the relation between God and the world. God is concealed in the world as fire is concealed in wood until it is brought forth by the fire-drill. He is in all things as butter is in cream and as water is in river-beds. The relation between God and the world is the same as between a magician and his magic. Again, it is the same as between a spider and the threads which it sends out.

God who covers Himself  
Like a spider, with threads  
Produced from Primary Matter, according to his own nature.

The worshipper is exhorted to have *bhakti* or love and devotion to God.

In place of the many gods of the Vedic period we have in these two *Upanishads* religion directed towards the Absolute, who is identified with one of the Vedic gods. Worship becomes more fervent and more devout than the Vedic sacrifice had been. Greater importance is attached to personal experience than to the corporate ceremonies of the earlier period. We have a new emphasis upon the importance and value of the religious teacher.\*

## II.

With this brief account of earlier theistic development, we may now pass on to the doctrine of God in the *Gita* (200 B.C. to A.D. 200).

\* Max Harrison, *Hindu Monism and Pluralism*, pp. 184-201.



According to the *Gita*, *Krishna is the Soul of the world*. "He who knows that I am unborn and without a beginning and also that I am the mighty Lord of the world—he among mortals is undeluded, and is freed from all sins."\* *He superintends creation, but is not in any way bound by it*. "At the end of a cycle all beings pass into Nature which is my own, O Arjuna; and at the beginning of a cycle I generate them again. Controlling Nature which is my own, I send forth again and again all this multitude of beings, which are helpless under the sway of Nature. And those works do not bind me, O Arjuna, for I remain unattached in the midst of my works like one unconcerned. Under my guidance Nature gives birth to all things—those that move and those that do not move; and by this means, O Arjuna, the world revolves."† *All men's activities arise from Him*. "Intelligence, knowledge, sanity, patience, truth, self-control, and calmness; pleasure and pain, being and non-being, fear and fearlessness; non-violence, equanimity, contentment, austerity, almsgiving, fame and obloquy—these different attributes of beings arise but from me."‡ *He orders the birth and rebirth of men according to their various deeds*. "The Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings, O Arjuna, causing them to revolve by his mysterious power, as if they were mounted on a machine."§ *He has no end to achieve but works for the sake of the world*. "There is nothing in the three worlds, O Arjuna, for me to achieve, nor is there anything to gain which I have not gained. Yet I continue to work. If I should cease to work, these worlds would perish; and I should cause confusion and destroy these people."|| *He becomes incarnate from time to time*. "Though I am unborn and my nature is eternal, and though I am the Lord of all creatures, I employ Nature which is my own, and take birth through my divine power. For the protection of the good, for the destruction of the wicked, and for the establishment of the Law I am born from age to age."¶ *His attitude to the world is controlled and inspired by love*. "Of these the man who knows, who has his devotion centred in One, and who is ever attuned, is the best. For supremely dear am I to the man who knows, and he is dear to me." "Listen again to my supreme word, the most secret of all. Thou art well beloved of me, therefore will I tell thee what is good for thee. Fix thy mind on me, be devoted to me, sacrifice to me, prostrate thyself before me, so shalt thou come to me. I promise thee truly, for thou art dear to me."\*\*

\* *Gita*, x. 3. The passages from the *Gita* in this paper are taken from the new translation by D. S. Sarma (S. Ganesan and Co., Madras).

† *Gita*, ix. 7-10.

|| *Gita*, iii. 22, 24.

‡ *Gita*, x. 4, 5.

¶ *Gita*, iv. 6, 8.

§ *Gita*, xviii. 61.

\*\* *Gita*, vii. 17; xviii. 64, 65.



*He delivers from sin those who go to Him alone.* "Knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the knowing subject—these three form the threefold incitement to action; and the instrument, the purpose, and the agent—these form the three constituents of action. Surrendering all duties, come to me alone for shelter. Do not grieve, for I will release thee from all sins."\* *He is full of grace towards those who seek Him.* "Though he may be constantly engaged in all kinds of work, yet, having found refuge in me, he reaches by my grace the eternal and indestructible abode. Fixing thy thought on me, thou shalt surmount every difficulty by my grace; but if from self-conceit thou wilt not listen to me, thou shalt utterly perish."†

The idea of God as set forth in the *Gita* is given in Chapter XI. a vivid and pictorial representation. There God appears in a vision to Arjuna. "Having spoken thus, O king, Krishna, the great Lord of Yoga, revealed to Arjuna his supreme and divine form: having many faces and eyes, presenting many a wondrous spectacle, decked with many divine ornaments and bearing many a heavenly weapon, wearing celestial garlands and vestments, anointed with divine perfumes, full of many a marvel, resplendent, boundless, universal. If the light of a thousand suns were to burst forth all at once in the sky, it would be like the splendour of that mighty One. In thy body, O God, I see all the gods and all the varied hosts of beings as well—Brahma the Lord on his lotus throne, and all the Rishis and the heavenly Nagas. I behold thee infinite in form on all sides, with myriad arms and trunks, with myriad faces and eyes. I see no end, nor middle, nor source to thee, O Lord of the universe, O Universal Form. I behold thee glowing as a mass of light everywhere with thy diadem, mace, and disc, dazzling the sight on every side, blazing like the burning fire of the sun, and passing all bounds. Thou art the Imperishable, the Supreme to be realized; thou art the Abode of the universe. Thou art the undying Guardian of the eternal law; Thou art the Primal Being, I believe. I behold thee as one with no beginning, middle, nor end; with infinite arms and infinite strength; with the sun and the moon as thine eyes; with thy face shining as a flaming fire, and with thy radiance consuming all this universe."‡ The importance of this vision cannot be exaggerated. In many ways it is the central passage of the *Gita*. For in it is gathered up in arresting symbol and vivid image qualities and attributes of God which in other places are all too inadequately described. If it is true that many of the highest intuitions of prophets and seers have come to them in visions, the weight which we attach

\* *Gita*, xviii. 18, 66.

† *Gita*, xviii. 56, 58.

‡ *Gita*, xi. 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.



to this vision should be very great indeed. We see here the glory, the power, the beauty, and the all-comprehensiveness of God. Though details of the picture may not appeal to us, we cannot but be impressed with the total effect of awe and splendour which it suggests.

Unfortunately we cannot stop at this point. The doctrine of God which we have set forth is consistent and belongs to the higher types of Theism. But we find two other strands of thought in the *Gita*, which essentially belong to its conception of God.

A. A passage in Chapter IV. runs thus: "Howsoever men approach me, even so do I accept them; for on all sides whatever path they may choose is mine, O Arjuna. Those who desire the fruit of their works worship the gods here; for quickly in this world of men do such works bear fruit." Again, in Chapter IX., "Even those who worship the other gods and are endowed with faith, worship me alone, O Arjuna, though in a wrong way. For I am the enjoyer and the lord of all sacrifices. But these men do not know my real nature, and hence they fall. Those who worship the gods go to the gods, those who worship the manes go to the manes, those who worship the spirits go to the spirits, and those who worship me come to me."\* This seems to mean that other gods may be worshipped; that rewards are given for such worship, though they are not of the highest kind; and that the Eternal and Supreme One accepts this worship as offered to Himself. This is the first strand I have referred to.

B. There are other passages which seem to indicate a monistic or pantheistic point of view. "To him the offering is God, the oblation is God; and it is God that offers it in the fire of God. Thus does he realize God in his works, and he teaches him alone." "I am the taste in the waters, O Arjuna; I am the light in the sun and the moon. I am the syllable OM in all the Vedas; I am the sound in ether and manliness in men. I am the pure fragrance in the earth and the brightness in the fire. I am the life in all creatures and the austerity in ascetics. Know me to be the seed, O Arjuna, of all things that are. I am the wisdom of the wise, and I am the glory of the glorious. I am the strength of the strong, free from desire and passion. And I am the desire in all creatures, O Arjuna, which is not in conflict with the law."† As Garbe says, "At one time Krishna says of himself that he is the one sole supreme God, the creator and ruler of the universe and of all things therein; at another he sets forth the Vedantic doctrine of the *Brahman* and of *Maya*, the cosmical illusion, and proclaims that the supreme end of man is to transcend this cosmical illusion and become one with Brahman. These two doctrines, the theistic and the pantheistic,

\* *Gita*, iv. 11, 12; ix. 23-25.

† *Gita*, iv. 24; vii. 8-11.



are interwoven with one another, sometimes following one another closely and without a break, sometimes more loosely connected."\*

### III

The question, therefore, to settle is whether the *Gita* is in essence theistic or monistic and why these two diverse elements are brought together in it. Several explanations have been offered for the presence of these contradictory views of Reality in the book.

1. It has been suggested that the author of the *Gita* was not a systematic thinker but a poet. Like most poets he was primarily interested in throwing out flashes of insight so expressed as to stir the soul and imagination of the reader. It was not his purpose to view the great problems of life necessarily from a single point of view. But his aim was rather to suggest, according to his different moods, various approaches to the fundamental problems which engage the attention of thoughtful men. When we read a poem we do not look in it for a carefully built-up system of thought. We rather seek to come in contact with a noble spirit who himself experiences moments of exaltation as he contemplates the universe and who takes his readers to such heights. While it is quite true that the *Gita* is essentially a poem, we cannot for that reason give up the search for an explanation of these contradictory ideas of Reality found in it. The author of the *Gita* belongs to that small group of poets who, though they write in verse and are capable of stirring the deepest emotions, are also interested in gathering their thoughts into some kind of a unified scheme. In other words, the author of the *Gita* is a thinker as well as a poet, and we cannot evade the problem before us by saying that he was really far more of a poet than a thinker.

2. Another explanation which has been offered is that the author of the *Gita* is a theist; the *Gita* as it came from his pen was completely theistic in its outlook, but a later editor has introduced into it passages which are monistic in their trend. The philosophy of Monism was becoming popular, and an editor who wanted to make use of an ancient document to support Monism has interpolated into it monistic ideas. This explanation is offered by Garbe. But, like all other theories of interpolation, it is impossible to prove it conclusively. It is always easy to get rid of difficult passages from our texts by supposing that they are due to a different hand. But how can we effectively and convincingly show that they are indeed so?

3. Another explanation which has been given is that the

\* Article on *Bhagavad Gita* in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*.



author of the *Gita* is above all interested in a synthetic view of life. He comes across different ideas, each with a measure of truth in it, and he sets them all forth without troubling to make up his own mind as to which is essentially correct. He knows, for instance, that there are three paths leading to God: *Karma Mārga* or the path of action, *Jñāna Mārga* or the path of knowledge, and *Bhakti Mārga* or the path of love. Instead of saying clearly and definitely that only one of these paths leads to God he describes all these paths, explains their difficulties and values and leaves us uncertain as to whether all these paths are of equal importance or whether one of them is of greater importance than the others. In the same way he is attracted by the theistic and the monistic approaches to God. He knows there is a measure of truth in both of them. He knows that God is a tremendous Reality and that sometimes He must be described in personal terms and sometimes in impersonal terms. He does not eliminate one of these, but allows both to stand together. This explanation does not do justice to the profound thought lying behind the *Gita*. It seems impossible after a careful study of the *Gita* to rest in the conviction that the author simply brought together two opposite points of view, realizing the value in each, but without making any serious attempt to resolve them into a complete harmony.

4. Yet another explanation of this apparent inconsistency is found in Rudolf Otto's recent book, *Mysticism East and West*. Professor Otto discusses Sankara's doctrine with regard to the *Saguna Brahman* (personal conception of God) and the *Nirguna Brahman* (impersonal conception of God). It will be remembered that Sankara uses the *Gita* to support his doctrine of *Advaita* or Monism. Professor Otto says: "The case is very similar with Sankara. When this relationship is understood one is no longer perplexed by his apparent 'confusion.' The method which he uses is really that of *samuchchaya* (summing up) with regard to the *Saguna* and the *Nirguna*-Brahman. Only thus is he comprehensible, and from this point the confusion in his writings is solved. Sankara can employ this method quite consistently, for the term 'Nothing' which the mystic uses of God is the superlative exaltation of the divine above all 'something.' In like manner Sankara's *Nirgunatvam* is the superlative of *Sagunatvam*. The former does not deny the latter, but the latter is taken up into the former. Therefore Sankara can justifiably pass from the standpoint of the *para vidya* to that of the *apara vidya* and *vice versa* a hundred times until the distinctions between them are completely obliterated (Eckhart does exactly the same). The significance of this process of *samuchchaya* is obviously to assure to the highest



Brahman all the conceivable divine values of theism and include them in the conception of the *Brahman*."\*

5. The explanation which I myself should like to put forth is this. With Ramanuja, the greatest theistic commentator on the *Bhagavad Gita*, I should like to understand all the seemingly monistic passages as really the expression of a belief in an immanent God. Take, for instance, the passage, "To him the offering is God, the oblation is God, and it is God that offers it in the fire of God."† It will be seen here that the apparatus of offering, the object offered, the devotee who offers it, and the fire in which it is offered are all equated with God. Here, surely, is Pantheism. Ramanuja in his famous commentary on the *Gita* explains the passage as meaning that the devotee contemplates Brahman as abiding in all acts. In other words, God is not the apparatus of offering; He is immanent in it. He is not the oblation; He is immanent in the oblation. He is not the devotee who offers; He is immanent in the devotee. He is not the fire in which the offering is made; He is immanent in the fire. In this way Ramanuja consistently explains all seemingly pantheistic passages in the *Gita*. Perhaps Ramanuja is right. The line between Theism and Pantheism is always so thin. The man who is full of God often finds God everywhere. He does not trouble to think out the logical implications. By maintaining that the passages in the *Gita* which seem to indicate Monism are really meant to teach Immanence we get a consistent point of view.

#### IV

There is another question of even greater practical importance. If it is true that the *Gita* is consistently theistic and if it is also true that through the ages it has had an unrivalled hold upon the thought and devotion of the people, how does it happen that Theism has never become the dominating religious philosophy of India? Today we find the *Gita* widely read. In previous ages it was probably not so widely read because education was confined to a few and religious instruction was not given to everyone. But we have reason to suppose that the thinkers and scholars of India have all along been influenced by this book. How, then, does it happen that through them it has not become the compelling philosophy of India? To this important question I should like to offer two solutions.

1. The first is that the *Gita* has failed to present a convincing case for Theism by accepting and allowing the worship of other gods. It is perfectly true that the *Gita* assigns a secondary place to these other gods. It is also true that the *Gita* points out that the reward which is attached to the worship of these gods

\* *Mysticism East and West*, p. 110.

† *Gita*, iv. 24.



is temporary and not of the best type. The highest type of reward is given only to the man who worships the Eternal and Supreme One. But even so, the very fact that these lesser gods are recognized has spoilt the completeness and the adequacy of the theistic position of the *Gita*. No faith spreads which thus compromises with lesser beings. It is only when faith is concentrated upon a single issue and its importance is emphasized without a shadow of doubt or hesitation that it wins a large following. That is how the Hebrew prophets left their impress on religion. They stood unflinchingly for their belief in one God. They did not allow any sort of room for other gods. They vigorously and emphatically called the attention of men to the Holy One of Israel. Their gaze was fixed on Him. Not for a moment did they allow themselves or their hearers and readers to divert their look to other beings.

2. The second solution which I should like to offer for the failure of the *Gita* to win for Theism a place of supremacy in the religious life of India is this. The Krishna of the *Gita* is not a personality of compelling interest and attraction. It is significant that the *Gita* recognizes that in order to win men the Absolute should be interpreted in terms of human personality. But who is the human personality through whom the Divine Being manifests Himself? He is Krishna the charioteer who, on the field of battle, urges Arjuna to enter boldly into the fray. Apart from the teaching which he gives, we seem to know so little about the Krishna of the *Gita*. The Krishna of the *Bhagavata Purāna* is an entirely different person. In spite of various doubtful elements in his character he has attracted the love and devotion of millions. Because he is described fully and his character is set out adequately, the Krishna of the *Bhagavata Purāna* has succeeded while the Krishna of the *Gita* has failed. The attempt to give the Absolute an embodiment in human personality has not been successful, for we know so little about this human personality, and what little we know about it is not good enough and true enough to stir a deep response in our souls. This is where we find the importance and the significance of the Christian revelation. Our Lord Jesus Christ shows us God not only with His words, but also in His life. We treasure the wonderful words He spoke about the Father, but we treasure still more the great picture of the Father He has given us in his own life. We behold Him in His many-sided ministry on earth, healing, teaching, loving, and suffering, and we say: "Behold, God is like Jesus Christ." The Absolute does not remain on far-off heights, but has come down to the earth and made itself known to men in ways which they cannot forget.

A. J. APPASAMY.



## MISCELLANEA

### NOTES AND COMMENTS

LAST winter, when we were fortunate enough to secure the help of Canon Hodgson as Assistant Editor of THEOLOGY, our readers will have become aware that we were finding it very difficult to combine the editorship of the Journal with the growing pressure of other work. That work has not tended to decrease, and is not likely to do so; and we have reluctantly, though without serious doubt, come to the conclusion that it is time for the main editorial responsibility to be transferred to other hands. Such retrospects and reflexions as we may be tempted to indulge in can be postponed to a later date, as the change-over cannot take place for another two or three months.

Meanwhile we are glad to extend a cordial welcome to the Master of the Temple, whom the S.P.C.K. have appointed to succeed to the Editorship. His wide learning, his pastoral experience, and the deeply instructive writings which have come from his pen in recent years afford ample guarantee that the Journal will not suffer; and we look for it to enter upon a period of increased usefulness and scope. We are glad to say that our circulation, despite the economic depression of recent years, has fallen by only six or seven per cent. from the high-water-mark reached early in 1930; but there is still ample room for expansion, and we do not doubt that Mr. Carpenter will bring it to pass.

We should be obliged if intending contributors to THEOLOGY would not send their MS. to us, but keep them until Mr. Carpenter (who is shortly paying a brief visit to Canada) is able to deal with them. We have a considerable number of manuscript articles in hand which we shall hope to use before relinquishing the Editorship. Exception is made in the case of "Notes" or "Studies in Texts," which can be passed on to the new Editor, in case we have not room for them ourselves.

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The Rev. P. Hartill writes to point out that in his review of Hartmann's *Ethics* in last month's issue of THEOLOGY (p. 97) the word "categorical" should have appeared as "categorial."

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Our readers will join us, we are sure, in hearty congratulations to Dr. E. O. James on his appointment to the new Professorship of the Philosophy and History of Religion in the University of Leeds. Dr. James is well-known as an anthropologist of learning and distinction; and in theology he has been a leading exponent of the Liberal Catholicism with which this Journal has been identified. We wish him God-speed in his new sphere of work.

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We have received from the Rev. U. Z. Rule a copy of a short pamphlet he has written "On the Lot of the Departed after Death." The writer concludes from an examination of a number of N.T. passages that many



who have died unrepentant are brought to repentance after death; but that this will not be for all. "For we are told that for some the end will be 'destruction,' which must be annihilation."

Through the kindness of a correspondent we are enabled to publish the following translation of a letter published in *Heimat und Glaube* (Athens, May 1, 1933), the monthly paper of the German Lutheran community at Athens.

"Owing to my Church functions I am unfortunately prevented from being present at the laying of the corner stone of your church. But the officers of our [Catholic] community will attend this ceremony and thereby demonstrate that, although separated from you by religious allegiance, yet united with you by the ties of blood, we share with our Evangelical brothers and sisters their joy at the accomplishment of their fervent desire. In the name of the [German] Catholic brotherhood, we extend to you, respected Herr Pastor, and to your community our most sincere and cordial congratulations on this joyful occasion. We pray God that this sacred place may prove for all Evangelical brothers and sisters a refuge where souls exhausted and bruised in the battle of life may find new consolation, strength and courage in communion with God. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express the hope that the same fraternal friendship and goodwill may continue to exist between our two communities that has existed heretofore. The love of Christ is, and should be, great enough to bridge over and cover the differences that separate us, and to bring to the fore the bond of faith, which unites us—the divinity of Jesus Christ. It must not be said that members of the German race, who in times of stress and danger to the Fatherland stood side by side and poured out their blood and worldly belongings in its defence without distinction of creed, felt themselves drawn more closely to co-religionists of other races than to each other.

If it was a great mistake on the part of our fathers, on both sides, to create a deep religious cleavage in our nation, we, their children, should not perpetuate this spirit. The difference in the worship of God, which we have inherited, should not mean a difference in our national life and spirit. The Lord God has permitted this religious cleavage, and we must bear it in humility and mutual toleration until the day when it shall please God to reunite us in faith.

With this fervent desire in our hearts and with the prayer that God may extend His hand in blessing over you and your community, we remain

In German Christian brotherhood,

FATHER RICHARD LIEBL.  
VALENTIN KUNZ.

## CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

May I be permitted to raise a *vocem clamantis in deserto* in defence of St. John Baptist, who now seems to be almost universally thought to have temporarily failed in his faith in our Lord's mission? It appears to me that the modern interpretation of St. Matt. xi. 2 *et seq.* does great



violence to a narrative which carries upon the face of it a quite straightforward account of a proceeding which is far from reflecting discredit upon the Baptist.

1. I would say in the first place that it is of course not impossible that St. John's faith should weaken, but all that we know about him makes it most improbable. His very *raison d'être* is to witness to Christ, and even before his birth he fulfilled this office; he himself claimed the Divine Vision of the descending Dove as the proof of the Messiahship of Jesus; his entire life was devoted to "preparing the way of the Lord." We should require evidence of the most stringent nature before we could believe in a *volte-face* involving the direct contradiction of the unswerving devotion and mission of a lifetime.

2. The modern view was all but unknown to the times nearer to the Gospels. Tertullian is, I believe, the sole exception among the Fathers who may be quoted in its defence. St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Jerome, St. Gregory, Theophylact, all clear the Baptist of any doubt or hesitation on his own part.

3. What then is his motive in this mission? His consistent attitude towards his disciples has always been to detach them from himself and attach them to our Lord. "He must increase, but I must decrease." The end of his ministry approaches and still there are followers who will not leave him, not yet ready to give whole-hearted acceptance to the claims of Jesus.

4. And his way of dealing with them is in entire consonance with the invariable method of our Blessed Lord Himself, who always taught *indirectly*, making people think for themselves and draw conclusions.

The Baptist, who lived only to draw attention to Him, could not have failed to note this very striking feature of His teaching; so instead of continuing to urge upon his own disciples the duty of attaching themselves to our Lord, he adopts the divine method of suggestion and of human co-operation with revelation.

5. What, otherwise, can we make of "When John had heard in the prison the works of Christ"? On the modern theory, as soon as increasing rumours reached him of the miracles which, according to the prophecies of Isaiah, were the special characteristics of Messiahship, then he began to doubt! Surely the reports of the growing fame of our Lord suggested to St. John that now was the favourable moment for a special effort to show to his own followers the more excellent way.

6. Lastly, apart from all this evidence, one might have thought that the plain words of our Lord Himself immediately after the departure of the messengers were enough to set at rest any question of the mind of the Baptist himself. "*As they departed*," He loses no time in reassuring the people who were standing round by an emphatic testimony to the unshaken steadfastness of His forerunner. Is he "a reed shaken with the wind"? No, indeed! On the contrary "a prophet, and more than a prophet . . . among those that are born of women there hath not risen a greater."

Yours faithfully,

J. WYLDE.

BECKENHAM, KENT,

October 21, 1930.



## NOTE

## FRIENDS OF REUNION

## CONFERENCE AT HIGH LEIGH

A DECISION was taken at High Leigh on May 16 which may well mark a turning-point in the history of Christianity in England. It was decided to launch a movement, to be called "Friends of Reunion," the aim of which may be described as an effort to popularize the Reunion movement, and to bring all English Christians to think no longer merely in terms of their own denomination or their own congregation, but to envisage the whole number of Christians in each locality and in the whole country as potential members of a reunited Church. The immediate programme of "Friends of Reunion" is to collect in each city and town groups for common study and prayer, and the promotion of mutual understanding of agreements and differences, and in some places for joint evangelistic work, and thus to prepare the way for the Reunion of the Church of England and the Free Churches. This step was first planned at a meeting at High Leigh last August of the British section of the Continuation Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order (Lausanne), under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of York. A provisional Statement was drawn up, and invitations were issued to various representative persons to become members of the Council. On May 15 and 16 the Conference at High Leigh was required to answer the question whether the time had come to launch the movement. The answer was given quite unambiguously by the united sense of the Conference.

The Chairman of "Friends of Reunion" is the Bishop of Coventry, Dr. Haigh. There is a Council consisting at present of some 85 members, representative of all the denominations which accept the Lausanne basis, and of all schools of thought. There is an Executive Committee of about 15 members, of which the Chairman is the Rev. James Reid, of Eastbourne (Presbyterian), and the Secretaries are the Master of the Temple (the Rev. S. C. Carpenter) and the Rev. Hugh Martin (Baptist). The secretarial office at present is Annandale, North End Road, N.W. 11, and membership is open to all who will accept the Basis; the minimum subscription has been fixed at 1s. a year, in order that no one may be excluded from membership for financial reasons.

The centre of the Statement which had been drawn up beforehand and was accepted by the Conference is the following Basis, which builds on the positive results reached by the Lausanne Conference. "This movement would put forward as such a basis the following three points, inviting the co-operation, as Friends of Reunion, of all who find themselves in general sympathy with this threefold basis: (a) Agreement as to the Church's common Christian Faith and Message as these are proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures and witnessed to and safeguarded in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. (b) Acceptance of the Sacraments of Baptism and of the Holy Communion as of Divine appointment, and as expressing for all the corporate life of the whole Fellowship in, and with, Christ. (c) A Ministry acknowledged by every part of the Church as possessing not only the inward call of the Spirit but also the Commission of Christ and the authority of the whole Body, and conserving all that the experience of the Church



has found to be valuable in the Episcopal, Presbyteral and Congregational forms of Church Order."

These points were explained in two speeches, by the Dean of York and Professor C. H. Dodd of Manchester (Congregationalist), which commanded general assent.

Dean Bate said that the phrase "The Catholic Church that is to be" can be regarded as really Pauline, in view of such words as "till we all come in the unity of the faith . . . unto a full-grown man" (Eph. iv). One could not for instance be satisfied with Anglicanism as it exists at present. Faith in the Church is faith in the City which hath foundations; faith in the Church is an essential part of the Creed, not an appendage to it. The true unity of the Church is not mere uniformity, or agreement of opinions, but a unity based on profession of the holy Name of God. The primacy of God's initiative, God's purpose, lies at the back of the Reunion movement. There are all sorts of secondary motives, such as overlapping and waste of resources; but it is God's Purpose that is primary.

Professor Dodd said that a limited objective had now become practical politics. But nothing must be done that would make wider Reunion more difficult (as between the Anglican and Orthodox Churches), nor anything that would break bonds of unity which exist (as, between Presbyterians and Reformed Churches on the Continent). He emphasized that the three points of the Basis represent results arrived at; they are definite propositions, not tentative suggestions. With regard to (a), Congregationalists had of course a traditional dislike to Creeds; but the Creeds are here affirmed as witnessing to and safeguarding the Christian Faith. When he was asked, "Do you want to impose them as tests?" he personally wished to reply, "Do you then want to go back on the affirmations contained in the Creeds and adopt the errors against which they were intended to guard?" With regard to (b), Christian religion was sacramental religion. We as churches practise these sacraments, not because we think that they are rather nice, but because we believe it to be God's will that we should practise them. With regard to (c), it is waste of time to discuss whether the Church could get on without a Ministry. All believe in the necessity both of the inward call of God, and of some act on the part of the Church. In Episcopacy we Free Churchmen see something of real value which we have not got; the same is true from the Anglican side with regard to the other two elements.

It was unambiguously affirmed in the meeting of the Council, and understood by the Conference as a whole, that the ultimate aim of "Friends of Reunion" is no narrower than that of Lausanne; that is to say, the Reunion of all Christian Churches, including the Church of Rome. At the same time the present task which lay before the movement was seen to be "Home Reunion," between the Church of England and the Free Churches.

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The foregoing may serve as a general account of the aims of "Friends of Reunion," as they were expressed at the Conference. But the writer of this article, as a member of the Council who shared in the responsibility for the decision to launch the movement, feels it his duty to add some notes of a more personal kind.

This movement promises to establish itself everywhere in England, and every reader of THEOLOGY is likely to be brought into contact with it,



and to have to decide whether he will leave it on one side, or take part in it. If we Anglo-Catholics come in, all sorts of difficulties, anxieties, and controversies await us. If we stay outside, the movement will none the less go on without us, and we shall none the less have to deal with it later on: for the Church of England is certainly not going to stay outside.

In the Basis as it stands there is nothing inconsistent with Catholic principles; on the contrary, we may well marvel at the extent to which the Catholic principles which it expresses have been accepted by our Protestant brethren. But then, as every reader of this article has seen already, and as the Conference also clearly understood, there is a close likeness between this programme and that of the South Indian Scheme. We all feel great anxiety with regard to the South Indian Scheme; some of us believe it to be sound, provided each denomination in coming into union is faithful to its own principles, as it promises when it accepts the Scheme; some of us have made up our minds more or less definitely against the Scheme as it stands. It is clear, however, that we are to be faced with the same problems in England. If we stay outside "Friends of Reunion," the features of the South Indian Scheme which we regard as objectionable will reappear here, perhaps in some still more objectionable form, and the Church of England will be involved. But there is hope that these objectionable features may be avoided here and the lessons of South India may be learnt, if we Anglo-Catholics come in, and in proportion to the vigour and whole-heartedness with which we throw ourselves into it.

In particular, we are faced with the distressing and perplexing problem of Intercommunion. At the Conference there was no Intercommunion; in view of the conflict of view on the matter, the course adopted—a sad and bitter course indeed, but the only course under the circumstances—was that no celebration of Holy Communion took place at all. The line taken by the Council was that Intercommunion is one of the major problems to be solved; that being so, the question cannot be prejudged. Therefore those who desire Intercommunion to be generally adopted as a means for increasing the spirit of unity, and those who believe it to be wrong in principle, have an equal right to belong to "Friends of Reunion." But the matter cannot rest there; the problem will have to be studied intensively. A responsibility therefore lies on us who believe that the policy of Intercommunion is wrong not to let the issue go by default, but to learn how to express our meaning in terms which the other side can understand. The discussion of this question will lead back to the exploration of the heights and depths of the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist; and we shall always find most sympathy from Free Churchmen when we talk with them about the things that we care for most.

Closely connected with this is the most central point of all—the question whether Reunion is to be regarded as the coming together of men who share high Christian ideals, to create an outward expression for their inward friendliness and unity of spirit; or whether it is to be seen as primarily a work of God, the accomplishment of a Divine Purpose to reconcile men with one another in the unity which He has created, not they, and which exists on earth in His Church. A wonderful degree of friendliness and goodwill exists already; but it is not on this that the Church of God is based. We Anglo-Catholics have a great responsibility towards "Friends of Reunion."

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.



## REVIEWS

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIANITY TO ETHICS. By Clement C. J. Webb, M.A., D.Litt. University of Calcutta Press. Pp. 121.

This volume contains eight lectures delivered before the University of Calcutta in 1930-31 on the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh foundation. As their author realized, the majority of his audience were probably non-Christian, and he has carefully kept that fact in view throughout the whole of his work. The result is that much which could have been taken for granted in addressing a Christian audience has required elaboration, while, as Dr. Webb says in his preface, "It should not be assumed that topics of which a discussion of Christian ethics, carried on by a Christian for Christians, might naturally be expected to include some notice, but which are not mentioned at all, or only slightly mentioned in this book, are therefore regarded by the writer as unimportant." In reading and discussing the book this *caveat* must be constantly borne in mind.

The task which lay before Dr. Webb was one of singular difficulty. India is a country in which, as in practically all polytheistic communities, there has been no necessary connection between religion and ethics. Of the official 330,000,000 deities there are, no doubt, many whose cult involves a high standard of conduct, and an appreciation of man's duty to his neighbour. The familiar doctrine of transmigration imports also a moral element into human life, though that element is weakened for most people by the absence of an effective memory-link between one form of existence and its successors. There are, on the other hand, deities—and some of them among the most popular—whose worship presents features indefensible on any known ethical code. These statements do not, of course, apply with great force to the Moslem community, but the only external acts of which it can be said that they are "un-Hindu" are violations of caste rules or of the *tabu* on the cow. In meeting the demands laid upon him by his duties, then, Dr. Webb has done very wisely in avoiding extended comparison or contrast between the Christian and the Hindu position. His purpose has been exposition, not controversy.

In the first lecture the writer gives a clear account of what he means by Ethics, and of what he proposes to take as the specifically Christian teaching on the subject. The former term, to him, involves both the recognition of a categorical imperative and a conception of a *Summum Bonum*. Christian doctrine, as he points out, has its roots in Judaism, and the only



reliable source from which we can deduce it is to be found in the words of Jesus as recorded in the canonical Gospels. In the second lecture he lays it down that the basis of all Christian ethic is to be found in the Law of Love—the two great commandments, love to God and love to man. This love “is a practical, not an emotional or . . . a ‘pathological’ love; and in the phrase, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself*,’ it is implied further that the right kind of self-love is of the same description” (p. 28).

The ideal thus set forth is then considered in relation to the conceptions prevalent in the world into which Christianity was born, and the demand for love is contrasted with the intellectualism of Greece (and, incidentally, of India) and with the Roman stress on patriotism. Both had their effect on Christianity in the long run, though both emerged in forms strange to the ancient world, the first as orthodoxy, and the second as national religion. Dr. Webb then speaks of the double ethical standard implied in the existence of monastic orders, and of the modern trend towards a materialistic attitude to life.

Can there, in the last resort, be any necessary connection between religion and morality? Do the two “great” commandments inevitably link themselves up one with another? If the categorical imperative, which is the final ethical authority, be, as it should be, autonomous, is it not a contradiction to make it depend on the will of God, and, therefore, an ethical inconsistency to make the sense of duty in conduct a product of love to God? Yet this is what Christianity apparently does, and Dr. Webb devotes his fifth chapter to a discussion of the problem thus raised. Rightly to appreciate his solution, we must read and re-read the whole chapter, but it may be said in summary fashion that the writer holds that, though true morality does not require an external sanction, it is an unrelated and unintelligible fact until correlated through religion, through belief in God, through love of God, with all other areas of experience.

Chapters VI. and VII. deal with certain more detailed aspects of Christian ethics, which serve as illustrations of the two fundamental principles accepted by Dr. Webb. First of these is asceticism, which, though not definitely enjoined by Jesus, and never held to be the duty of all Christians, has, nevertheless, played a large part in some forms of Christian practice. It is pointed out that its function has always been, not so much to acquire merit, as to allow men to escape the more pressing temptations to sensuous enjoyments of various kinds. The social aspect of Christian ethics also receives a whole chapter, in which such subjects as slavery, the position of



woman, philanthropy, war, and the accumulation of material wealth, are discussed. The last lecture is in part a summary of all that has gone before, and closes with an appeal for a fuller mutual understanding and sympathy between the various religions, as the only means whereby religion can at all be protected against the attacks which menace it from so many sides in the modern world.

The line of thought and exposition which Dr. Webb has taken is familiar to every student of Christian Ethics and Apologetics. It is clearly stated, and the whole is marked by acute reasoning, which cannot but have appealed to the audience whom the writer addressed in the first instance. It is only with the utmost diffidence that criticism can be offered, and yet, as Dr. Webb himself has said, there is much that might have been looked for which has necessarily been omitted. The only question is as to whether this "minus" would not have been more effective than some elements in the presentation actually offered.

We note, then, in the first place, that Dr. Webb's whole position depends on the fundamental validity of personality. This is as it should be, for an interpretation of Christianity which contradicted this would ignore the Jewish ancestry of Jesus. So much is a personal interpretation of religion an essential part of Western thinking, that we do not realize its importance. Still less does it normally occur to us that in Aryan thought the conception of personality occupies a comparatively subordinate place. This is, to some extent, true of Western thinkers also, but only in cases where there is a definite breach with Christianity. A Christian metaphysic, equating God with its Ultimate, would regard Him as the final synthesis of all positive reality, and would recognize as the most significant of all forms of being—at any rate for religion and ethics—what we call personality. Christian philosophy must take the form of a "personal idealism," though not necessarily that which we associate with the school of Rudolf Eucken. But this is far from being true of Hinduism. Personality, to an audience whose thinking is, or is based on, that of the Vedanta, is a temporary manifestation which may even be illusory, and the supreme goal of humanity is its extinction.

Dr. Webb has wisely devoted a good deal of space to exposition of the categorical imperative. That, again, is a conception which it must be very difficult for the average Hindu to grasp. Bengali, presumably the vernacular of the majority of Dr. Webb's audience, contains no word or term which adequately represents the English "duty." The nearest is *karttabya karma*—"the work which must be done"—and it implies



necessity at least as much as duty. So the stress on the contrast between an absolute command of conscience and a conditional order given by irresponsible omnipotence is by no means unnecessary, even though it leads Dr. Webb into an apparent dilemma from which he finds it difficult to escape. It is perhaps in this point, in the correlation of the two great commandments, that we feel unconvinced by the reasoning of the author. His case, may we venture to suggest, would have appealed more strongly to the Hindu mind had he fallen back once more on the final Christian metaphysic. For it is characteristic of the teaching, even of the New Testament, that God is not thought of as being *merely* a person endowed with all good attributes to an infinite degree. While personality is that aspect which is of primary importance for religion, God is yet more than personal. He is not merely *living, true, loving*; He is *life, truth, love*. It is no great step to take that we should think of Him also as being Himself, in one of His aspects, the moral law, the categorical imperative. How can He not be? The question, then, as to the contingency or necessity of the moral law ceases to exist.

Even the presentation of the Christian ethic as based on the two great commandments may be open to criticism. The normal Indian rendering of "love" would be *prem*, and *prem*, as expressed in practical Hinduism, is something which not even the most devout of Hindus would associate with morality. Dr. Webb, however, carefully guards against any possible misunderstanding by his lucid exposition, and shows that Christian love is very much nearer to *bhakti* than to *prem*. That is all to the good, but might he not have gone deeper still? The two commandments are selected by Jesus as the best that Judaism had to offer, and as a useful practical guide. But He Himself went further, and laid it down as the first requirement made of His followers that they should "deny themselves." It is, after all, complete self-abnegation which alone makes love itself possible from the Christian point of view, and which will, in the end, lead to that supreme spiritual achievement of faith whereby a man can say, "I have been crucified with Christ; I live no longer, but Christ lives in me." There are, it is true, the gravest dangers of misunderstanding when this doctrine is set before an audience predominantly Hindu, and the greatest care must be taken to insist that self-surrender and absorption in Christ are ethical and not metaphysical, and this is possibly the reason why Dr. Webb laid so little stress on the principle of self-denial.

These remarks are, however, but suggestions as to a possible alternative means of approach to the problems involved. Dr.



Webb has chosen his own line, as a scholar and thinker of his calibre has every right to do, and he has stated his case with clarity and, for the most part, with conviction. Slight as it is in size, this volume should prove of the highest value as an introduction to the study of Christian ethics.

T. H. ROBINSON.

THE GOSPEL IN THE EARLY CHURCH. By James Mackinnon.  
Longmans. 16s.

Professor Mackinnon prefaces this study of "the developing faith of the Early Church" with this significant statement:

"In the face of the widespread knowledge and the religious perplexity of the age, many Christian men and women are striving to rethink their faith and relate it to their own experience and mentality. These men and women are sincere believers in the Gospel, if they cannot accept the traditional version of it in its entirety. Their endeavour does not mean disloyalty to Jesus and his teaching, or to what may be found to be the legitimate development of it in the thought of his immediate disciples and their early successors. It means the retention of the imperishable truths of the Gospel, which, apart from the forms in which current thought clothed them, the larger knowledge and experience of our age only tend to confirm. If some of the beliefs imported into it have become obsolete or problematic, the things that really matter are an abiding heritage" (p. ix).

We may expect, then, to find in this book "the imperishable truths of the Gospel," "the things that really matter," "sincerely believed," "in loyalty to Jesus and His teaching," quite rightly stripped of anything in their original presentation which has become "obsolete or problematic." What, then, is Professor Mackinnon's conception of the essential Primitive Gospel?

"It is a conviction about Jesus, based not on the schools, but on personal contact with the Master in his life, and spiritual contact with the Lord through the resurrection experience. . . . The Primitive Gospel perpetuates the power of Jesus' personality" (p. 31).

This personality, together with the true facts of the world, have brought Christianity into being:

"The fact of a moral government of the world and the moral responsibility of the individual in a world so governed—the obligation to repent of sin, to turn to God, to live the higher life in the light of this fundamental fact . . . coupled with the fact that in Jesus of Nazareth there appeared one worthy to be its founder . . . is what really gave birth to Christianity" (pp. 32, 33).

Consequently, remove all but this, and the "abiding heritage" is clear. For instance: Jesus and His disciples "thought in an apocalyptic groove," without which it is



possible (though difficult to believe) that the memory of His personality might have perished. Now,

"Whether we share this Jewish belief or not in the sense that these Primitive Christians shared it, it serves to convey to us a sense of the surpassing greatness of the life and personality in which they saw the embodiment of it. This at all events was a reality, and this reality is the abiding thing. The nearer to him, the nearer to this reality" (p. 33).

This, however, could not be made clear, for the Apostolic preachers were confronted, when attempting to proclaim the Gospel, with the problem of the death of the Messiah (p. 4). Accordingly, they "had recourse to the Pharisaic doctrine of predestination, which Jesus Himself had held." They fell "back on the Jewish idea of vicarious suffering in accordance with God's eternal determination." "The death of Jesus is . . . not only foredoomed by God; it was foreseen and foretold by the prophets" (pp. 4, 5).

What, then, are we to say about God?

"Why did God permit this unspeakably brutal, blind, and wicked act? Why must the highest and the best of mankind be delivered to a horrible death as the victim of human passion and fury? Where is the Providence of a merciful God, and why should such a revolting enormity be necessary for man's salvation? The disciples do not ask, and we, who do ask, cannot find any more satisfactory answer than that, as human life is conditioned, it seems that it must be so, and that, as history shows, God does work by terrible methods in the gradual elevation of humanity and does make use of suffering for great ends, not all known to us" (p. 5).

This Professor Mackinnon calls "a philosophy of suffering."

These quotations are not for a moment intended to summarize the matter of this book, but only to show something of its drift. What seems to emerge from the chaotic questioning of modern times is a tremendous faith in the "personality" of Jesus, whose function has been to show us what reality really is in such a way that emotional and intellectual and spiritual propinquity to Him is propinquity to reality. This is good—but what about God? God is mentioned either in order that a great question mark may be set against His behaviour in allowing the "tragic" (p. 4) death of Jesus—a question mark which we avoid by saying "that it seems it needs must be," by pretending that we can descry in history, as a result of suffering, "a gradual elevation of humanity," and by dubbing this a philosophy, or in order to attest to the worthiness of Jesus' humanity (Jesus is "the God-attested man" [p. 3]) in the Resurrection experiences, though this is really superfluous, since the "rational, moral, and spiritual element, in which human personality consists, and which Jesus as a man shared



with us . . .” is of divine origin. For “reason and conscience alike attest that man is, in this sense, made in the image of God—His handiwork” (p. 80). God, then, provides us with a superfluous proof of the divinity of human nature, and His behaviour towards Jesus on the Cross ceases to be questionable when we recognize that “humanity” has been “elevated” through suffering and construct out of this a “human” wisdom, a “philosophy.”

It is evident, then, that the “critico-historical” method (p. ix) is very different in its results from modern methods of Biblical Criticism. These might lead us to suppose that the “placarding of Christ crucified” was, far from being an apologetic afterthought forced upon the Apostolic preachers by an unpleasant “tragedy,” the very root of the Gospel. The misapprehension has arisen, of course, from a failure to bring everything to the bar of modern common-sense and to be interested only and supremely in human values. View the death of Jesus from the human point of view, as a tragedy, and you can still rest in an erotic and satisfied admiration of His humanity as humanity. See that humanity miserably laid down upon the Cross as the supreme act of glorifying God and nullified of all intrinsic human value so that from the human point of view you are simply and inevitably disgusted, and you have to pass from the human Jesus to God Himself. But this the critico-historian cannot do. For by definition he cannot consider the life and death of Jesus as the action of God. And so every book of the New Testament must seem to him inconsistent and unequal, since the common theme, which alone makes sense of them because it made sense to their authors, is the action of God in a humanly offensive Man. The Old Testament might have provided a key, but the Old is also incomprehensible, being concerned with men yearning, not for man, but for God. Accordingly, for example, on the very first page of what pretends to be a scholarly book, Professor Mackinnon examines the words *εὐαγγελίζομαι* and *εὐαγγέλιον*, being careful to refer to the pagan instances cited by Deissmann, but omitting the New Testament appearances of *εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ*, and making no mention at all of the use of *εὐαγγελίζομαι* in the Septuagint, where it equally has an embarrassing association with the action of God.

After this initial oversight it is difficult to take the book seriously, impressive though the frequently recurring lists of authorities are (indeed, we are told in the Preface that the author read even more books than he has cited: were any of the works of Karl Barth among those which he has omitted to mention?) The argument follows the usual course. St. Paul



(a man with a "sensitive conscience," "intense and high-strung," lacking "the balanced mind which can control its religious obsessions") is chiefly responsible for the importation of "obsolete and problematic" beliefs. His technique, even, is questionable. Twice at least (pp. 121, 123) Professor Mackinnon is able to show how he could "have been much more effective." At his door we must lay this terrible propitiation language. He it is that wanders "into the realm of current speculation and belief which Jesus Himself refrained from entering," and so attributes "pre-existence and a cosmic significance as the agent of creation" to Jesus (p. 80). Above all, he originated the tendency to "disparage reason versus faith" (p. 326). Heinous fault! (for, after all, God-attestation is not so good as solid human proof), "He (Paul) never thinks of setting forth the arguments for immortality apart from the resurrection, or in confirmation of the resurrection" (p. 141). The Synoptic Gospels, Johannine writings, etc., are tainted with Pauline doctrine, etc.

In conclusion, one question: What grounds, other than purely personal ones, have I for basing my faith upon a personality which was not only condemned to death by the reasonable, intelligent people of the day, but was forsaken even by those who had followed? Professor Mackinnon may consider Jesus "worthy." It is possible for others to convict Him of a hundred sins and to consider Him a deluded maniac or worse, judging by the records of His humanity. But, in any case, whether it is Professor Mackinnon with his "critico-historical" method, or "I" with my reprehensible orthodox bias (*vide* various notes), human judgment is made the basis of belief. Unless, that is to say, it is really made to stumble upon the rock of offence, the crucified Christ, the ultimate scandal, and so nailed to the Cross with His humanity and made nothing. Then, of course, it will no longer be possible to say or to think anything which will commend itself critico-historically, but, instead, there may be, by God's grace, faith, not in a creature—however truly the "highest and the best of mankind"—but in God. And, unless this happens, I fear I shall say "Good Master"—and go away sorrowful.

NOEL DAVEY.

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## NOTICES

THE PSALMS, BOOK III. Hebrew text by W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D.  
S.P.C.K. 5s.

This is a splendid little work. The prefatory note sums up the whole position well, when it states that "historical, doctrinal, and liturgical



causes have contributed in making the text of the Psalms different from what it was originally." This concise note should stimulate the student to search out and consider those various sources and causes. The grammatical notes are most useful for students, but they are perhaps somewhat short; the excellent vocabulary, however, is very helpful. The author does not make clear, in this work, whether certain of the emendations suggested in the text are the result of his own speculation. It would be well to give this information in another edition. Since the work deals chiefly with the Hebrew text, other matters concerning the Psalms can only receive the shortest notice. Questions of date, however, are frequently referred to, and it would appear that the note at the beginning of Psalm 79, which reads "The Psalm belongs in all probability to the early time of the Maccabæan struggle," could scarcely be an adequate description of the Psalm, when one considers the close resemblance which this Psalm bears to certain ancient Babylonian penitential psalms.

The book is certainly to be recommended, both for class work and private study, as it introduces the student, in a careful and guarded way, to the many difficulties which exist in the Hebrew text.

J. R. TOWERS.

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AMICITIÆ COROLLA. A volume of Essays presented to James Rendel Harris, D. Litt., on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday. Edited by H. G. Wood. University of London Press, Ltd. 10s. 6d.

This volume of essays is a worthy tribute to a great scholar of varied attainments. They cover many of the fields in which Dr. Rendel Harris has made his name. The subjects vary from Testimonies to the origin of the Tribe of Judah and from the Molianides to the relation between Jesus and the Spirit in St. John's Gospel. The contributors come from England, America, Germany, and Holland. The Dutch contributions are translated, the German are not. The book is hardly one for the general public. Essays such as those on the Text of Mark in Some Dated Lectionaries and Codex D of the Pauline Epistles, valuable though they are, will appeal to few but specialists. But the regular student of the Bible will find much diverse material of the highest interest. The level of erudition and scholarship displayed throughout the volume is very high. It is strange, however, to find a Nonconformist Professor on p. 59 speaking of the Immaculate Conception, when he means the Virginal Conception. And we cannot understand what Dr. Purdy means when on p. 256 he asserts that there is no definite evidence that a Jewish gnosticism "was an active religious movement in the first century." What are we to make of the Epistle to the Colossians, not to say the Pastoral Epistles? Nor are we convinced by the suggestion on p. 141 that "when in the Fourth Gospel Jesus clears the Third Temple, whip in hand, the episode only betrays the original twin character of our Lord." That seems to echo one of the less permanently valuable speculations of Dr. Harris's later years. Happily the volume as a whole is free from the extravagances of this type of criticism. We commend it to the attention of all New Testament scholars. One great merit of a volume of this kind is that it gives the opportunity for the preservation in print of papers of a specialist kind of lasting value which would otherwise lack a publisher.

E. J. BICKNELL.



THE GOSPEL OF DIVINE ACTION. By Oliver Chase Quick, D.D. Nisbet and Co. 5s.

This small volume is based on a course of lectures delivered to clergy at St. David's Library, Hawarden. It expounds certain positions maintained in Canon Quick's earlier writings, especially his well-known book on the Sacraments. As such it deserves the attention of all who are interested in theological questions. Canon Quick's books are not always easy reading, and we wonder if some of his longer sentences as originally spoken did not perplex his hearers, but he has the great merit of getting down to ultimate issues in theological thought. We would specially call attention to the importance of a theology of the Sacraments which unites and reconciles both the instrumental and symbolic aspects of sacramentalism. We believe that Canon Quick's warning against the tendency in modern Anglo-Catholicism to fix almost exclusive attention on the latter aspect is much needed.

E. J. BICKNELL.

A SHORT RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF ISRAEL. By E. W. Hamond, M.A., S.C.M. 4s.

THE EIGHTH CENTURY PROPHETS. By E. W. Hamond, M.A. With a Preface by Dr. Cyril Norwood. S.C.M. 4s.

In a series of seven volumes Mr. Hamond aims at showing the development of religious ideas from Moses to Christ by means of a number of carefully selected passages from the Old Testament and Apocrypha, arranged as far as possible in chronological order. They are written for the uninstructed, in order to bring the work of the Old Testament specialist within his reach, and Dr. Norwood speaks of their use in public and secondary schools.

Two volumes are to cover the history, and four are to consist of passages from the Prophets, the Wisdom literature, Apocalyptic literature, and the Psalms, while a short religious history of Israel is to be a companion volume to each of the other five. The scheme seems an admirable one, and the two volumes under review have already appeared.

The *Short Religious History of Israel*, containing useful charts and maps, tries throughout to prevent the wood from being obscured by the trees. Its definite intention is to show the gradual revelation which found its fulfilment in the New Testament, and the author's concern lies "not so much with the generally accepted beliefs of the Israelites at any given period, as with their contribution to religion as a whole. Taking as our standard Christianity as taught and lived by Christ and as applied to the many-sided life of the world by the Holy Spirit, we can to some extent test what went before, distinguishing truths from half-truths and from misconceptions."

Two things in the book seem to call for criticism. Considering the importance of Abraham in New Testament thought, it seems strange that all reference to him is omitted, and the religion of the Israelites seems to begin abruptly with Moses at the burning bush. And in the handling of the book it is unfortunate that the 250 paragraphs into which it is divided should have titles of contents in the Introduction, but only numbers in the book itself, thus involving much turning of pages.

The *Eighth Century Prophets* is the other volume which has appeared. The introductions are clearly and simply written, and the



book should prove a helpful one. But there are points about the extracts which call for criticism. It is rather surprising to find that those from Amos and Hosea taken together are considerably longer than those from Isaiah. And although the scheme of the series demands an arrangement in chronological order, it seems curious to find the Messianic passages in Isaiah ix. and xi. passed over without mention, though presumably they will find a place in a later volume.

The General Introduction to the series begins well by declaring that the version of 1611 "vies with Shakespeare for the first place in enriching and establishing our language." But the prophets are rendered in a "simple rhythmical translation," which certainly saves the need for many notes on the text, but is very far removed from the Revised Version. In a series which had critical study as its first aim this might be a gain, but as the object of this series is distinctly "religious," it is a real loss that the reading of the extracts should give so little help towards either the understanding or the appreciation of the English Bible. To give an example: the difficult words in Hosea iv. 4, "Thy people are as they that strive with the priest," are simply altered by a familiar emendation into "Thy people are but like their priestlings."

But those who wish for a guide to understanding how the Holy Ghost "spake by the prophets," as leading to a final revelation in the Incarnate Son of God, will find in this series much that will help them.

T. W. CRAFER.

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THE LIVING WORD IN A CHANGING WORLD. By W. T. Davison, D.D.  
Epworth Press. 6s.

Under this title the author gives us his "thoughts on religion today." It always demands a respectful and interested hearing when one belonging to an older generation opens his mind and tells us how he has succeeded in adjusting the faith of his youth to the new knowledge of today. There may therefore be many who may like to hear him on the very large number of topics on which he touches. His bias is away from Catholicism and towards the Protestant Free Churches. He feels that "it is amongst these Churches that the best hopes of pure and beneficent religion are to be found," and he hopes that the *via media* of the Church of England, with its pathetic hesitancy, "does not mean the middle road between truth and error." He thinks that the hopes and ideals of today may be said to circle round some such words as these; Unify, Simplify, Realize (or Vitalize), and Evangelize.

T. W. CRAFER.

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THE JOY OF DISCIPLESHIP. By H. J. Carpenter. London. Skeffington.  
3s. 6d.

In this well-written and well-balanced book the writer traces with a sympathetic touch the influence of the Tractarians on the life of the Church of today. He dwells upon the essential holiness of the Movement, shows where it supplemented Evangelical narrowness, treats of its faith in Christ, and therefore in the Church, its stress on "detachment," on humility—and here he says that Catholic humility should forbid any contempt for non-Catholics, on Love, on Penitence, and a disciplined rule of life, and so passes to the joy of Prayer and Communion, and the un-



failing certainties of the Home of Grace. There is a real Tractarian spirit running through it, and success in showing how that spirit may guide life and thought today.

W. J. FERRAR.

**THE MYSTERY OF THE CROSS.** By Nathan Söderblom, sometime Archbishop of Uppsala. Translated by Fr. A. G. Hebert, SS.M. S.C.M. Press. 2s.

One of the dangers of the Anglican Communion is its isolation from Continental religious thought, both Catholic and Protestant. Fr. Herbert has done English readers a great service in providing them with a means of entering into the thought of that great Apostle of Unity, Archbishop Söderblom. It is a devotional study of the Passion offered as a "message for the children of this troubled age." But its interest is theological as well as devotional. Swedish Lutheranism has not abandoned an objective Atonement. The Archbishop's words on Suffering in the Godhead have much in common with the thoughts of Mr. Studdert Kennedy. They will bring encouragement to all who face the problem of pain whether in others or in themselves.

TREVOR JALLAND.

**THE INNER LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC.** Archbishop Goodier, S.J. Longmans. 5s.

This is a simple and devotional statement of the Catholic religion. There is in it little that is distinctively Roman, and as an exposition of our common Faith it might commend itself to any Anglican reader.

Here and there one detects the danger of using popular language in treatment of a theological mystery, e.g., on page 79: "This daily renewal of the actual sacrifice of Calvary is the Sacrifice of the Mass." We notice in the context the word "renew" or cognate words occur no less than five times over. No doubt the author's explanation helps to safeguard this use; but one cannot feel sure that the impression left on the ordinary reader's mind (and it is for him rather than the theologian that the book is written) would be wholly satisfactory.

The Roman Church has failed altogether to free itself from the embarrassing legacy of a "destruction" theory of Sacrifice, and hence tends to associate the Eucharistic Action with Death rather than with Life. "Renewal" to the popular mind suggests repetition, a conception finally ruled out by the Council of Trent itself. More guarded the Council defined, "*Dominus noster . . . in coena novissima . . . visibile . . . reliquit sacrificium quo cruentum illud semel in cruce peragendum repræsentaretur.*"

The Archbishop's charm of writing and sweet reasonableness are his own commendation.

TREVOR JALLAND.

**THE SECRET STORY OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.** By D. Morse-Boycott. Skeffington. 12s. 6d.

**THE OXFORD MOVEMENT IN SCOTLAND.** By W. Perry. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

**THE HISTORY OF ST. BARNABAS, PIMLICO.** Catholic Literature Association. 1s. 6d.

The publishers of Mr. Morse-Boycott's book have been unwise enough to suggest that it will stand next to Dean Church's *Oxford Movement*.



The author himself would have been both too shrewd and too modest to make so extravagant a claim. What he has given us is a pleasant, gossip account of the whole Movement up to 1933, diligently compiled, using Pusey's *Life*, Isaac Williams' *Autobiography*, and Burgon's *Twelve Good Men*, but also drawing largely from Ollard, Kelway and other modern books. The complete absence of paged references is rather exasperating.

The story—why it should be called secret does not appear—has lots of human interest, some humour, some exaggerations, some minimizing, occasional bad taste, an evident wish not to be unfair, and complete confidence that the Anglo-Catholic Movement, which is thought of as wholly continuous, has gone from strength to strength and is now an army, terrible with banners. It is not a serious addition to our knowledge of the period, but it is very readable.

It contains some mistakes in fact. The *Church Times*, with all its merits, was not the first Church paper. The "poison in the national pot" in 1870 was not a "Conscience Clause." The Bishop of Birmingham never made the suggestion which is ascribed to him. *Lux Mundi* did not lose itself "nowhere in particular." And if *Lux Mundi*, with its effect, be put out of court, as it seems to be, though it wins some praise, we cannot help wondering who comprise "the host of sober Catholic scholars who have led us into surer ways." The fact is that the author's metal is not quite heavy enough to justify verdicts of this kind.

He pats the "British Museum School" on the back, though he does not share their view. He has a word of unstinted praise for the Church Missionary Society, though he interprets the likes and dislikes of Evangelicals in one place in a way which will surprise many of them very much. He sees the whole story through tinted spectacles. Was Dean Church's famous tribute to the courage of the Lincoln Judgment really "hasty"? Was the Dean ever hasty? And was its courage really "diminished by its sheer futility"? Did the Malines conversations really "lay certain ghosts for ever"? Is it true that "the autonomy of the Anglican Communion, its freedom in matters of liturgy and language, the marriage of the clergy, the administration of Holy Communion in both kinds, are no longer stumbling-blocks in the way of Reunion"? And does the observance of December 8 in the Prayer Book Calendar really prove that the Conception of our Lady was Immaculate?

The best part of this skilful, interesting and almost entirely good-natured book is the end, where also may be found all the "secrets" that the book contains. There is a glowing account of Bishop Frank Weston. Some rather hard things are said about some people, but they are said honestly and straightforwardly, with partisanship, but no personal animus. The story of the London Synod of 1928, with the correspondence which ensued between the Bishop and twenty-one of his clergy, is given in full. As is well known, there are some who draw quite different conclusions from the episode, but here are the facts, accurately related, and it is clear that the twenty-one have among them some able controversialists.

Dr. Perry's book begins with a short and very lucid account of early days at Oxford, and then turns to Scotland. The English reader will learn much that he probably did not know: the disabilities under which the Scottish clergy suffered in England until 1864, the slowness of progress and the amount of suspicion that was entertained for a long while by most of the Bishops, the difference between the appeal made by the Movement to the southern and northern parts of Scotland. Dr. Perry does



full justice in a short space to pioneers like Lady Lothian (who was eventually carried off her feet with Manning) Lord Forbes, the Earl of Glasgow and Mr. Gladstone. It is wonderful to think that Perth Cathedral, the first Cathedral to be built since St. Paul's, was practically the work of two young men, aged twenty-two and eighteen. We hear something of Glenalmond, and of the beautiful Collegiate Church of Cumbernae, and we have a very just and sympathetic picture of Bishop Forbes, "the Scottish Pusey." The author even finds room for a chapter on the Catholic Movement in Presbyterianism, with tributes to Milligan, McLeod, Cooper and Wotherspoon. The book contains the quiet, well-told story of a development which arose on a soil which in some respects was easier than ours, and has proceeded steadily, without extravagance.

*The History of St. Barnabas* makes no claim to be particularly original. It is founded on memoirs of Bennett, Lowder and others, and on the Parish Magazine. But the record is full of interest. The riots and the pioneer work done at St. Barnabas for Plainsong are in themselves enough to make a story, and many besides those who are connected with the Church will be glad to read it.

S. C. CARPENTER.